Category Archive: Analysis

  1. Between Capitalism and the State-System

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    How should we explain periods of profound global transformation? Scholars have long viewed socio-political change as a reflection of property relations and technological shifts in the productive process. They positioned capitalism as the principal force shaping world politics, with states broadly operating in the interest of maintaining capitalist social relations. In recent decades, however, a parallel tradition of thought has gained ground. In this tradition, the bureaucratic and military consolidation of states operates as the driver of economic relations, and international competition between states is the ultimate impulse for transformations within those same states. These two traditions of thought offer different accounts of the major challenges of our time, from climate change, to war, to austerity and sovereign debt. Should we understand these developments through the interests of capital, or should we instead conceive of them as the product of inter-state competition? The question is not merely of analytical interest; where we place emphasis directly informs the sort of solutions we envision to global problems. If climate change and war are the result of inter-state competition, greater cooperation can lead to a solution. If they are the result of capitalism, instead, they will remain unresolved until we do away with the economic system itself. In what follows, my aim is not to settle this discussion, but instead to revisit the debate over the relationship between capitalism and the states-system and introduce an important and overlooked turning point: the rise of Great Power politics. Ultimately, I argue that capitalism cannot subsume the dynamics of the states-system. In fact, it is itself derivative of a specific pattern of international ordering.

    Capitalism and the state system

    Immanuel Wallerstein’s landmark Modern World-System (1974) dates the origins of our existing order to North-western Europe in the sixteenth century, where a new mode of production geared towards the “endless accumulation of capital” and grounded in a world-spanning trade-based division of labor takes hold.1Immanuel Wallerstein, (<)em(>)The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century(<)/em(>), 66–131; Giovanni Arrighi, “Capitalism and the Modern World-System: Rethinking the Nondebates of the 1970’s,” (<)em(>)Fernand Braudel Center Review(<)/em(>) 21, no. 1 (1998): 113–29. As he puts it, this capitalist world economy is defined by “production for sale in a market in which the object is to realize the maximum profit.”2Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,” (<)em(>)Comparative Studies in Society and History(<)/em(>) 16, no. 4 (1974): 398. In his account, an international system of states emerged shortly thereafter, fully enshrined by the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648).3Wallerstein, (<)em(>)World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction(<)/em(>) (Duke University Press Books, 2004), 42. This, for him, was a non-coincidental development— capitalism could never emerge and sustain itself in the state apparatus characteristic of  world-empires like China and Rome, where bureaucracies absorbed too much profit. The development and persistence of capitalism required an economically connected world that was “larger than any juridically-defined political unit.”4Wallerstein, (<)em(>)The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century(<)/em(>), 15–16. The implication of this view was that any serious analysis of the global economy and world politics would involve tracing major transformations back to capitalism’s internal dynamics. 

    In what was hardly a ringing endorsement of the position, John G. Ruggie summed up Wallerstein’s solution, stating that for him the international system of states was “at one and the same time an epiphenomenal byproduct of intercapitalist competition and the necessary structural condition for the existence and continued survival of capitalism.”5 John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” (<)em(>)World Politics(<)/em(>) 35, no. 2 (1983): 262. In a related vein, other prominent social scientists like Aristide Zolberg thought this work exhibited a ‘systematic neglect of political structures and processes.’ See his “Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link,” (<)em(>)World Politics(<)/em(>) 33, no. 2 (1981): 253–81. A decade after the publication of Wallerstein’s magnum opus, the historical sociologist Charles Tilly offered a more muted critique, hoping that someone would “succeed in writing a ‘total history’ that would account for the entire development of both” capitalism and the states-system, which he described as “the two interdependent master processes of the modern era.”6Charles Tilly, (<)em(>)Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons(<)/em(>) (Russell Sage, 1984), 147, 73–74.

    For Wallerstein’s framework, the central issue is that the two timelines—the emergence of capitalism, and the emergence of the international state system—have to align, with the rise of the former preceding that of the latter by some margin, as well as plausibly causing its rise. If no relationship between the two can be established at the point of origin, then we know that one has existed without the other, and that the two can accordingly be treated as relatively autonomous social processes, with their own potentially clashing dynamics. Over time, pace Wallerstein, this alignment has appeared increasingly elusive. The first major challenge originated among Marxists attacking Wallerstein’s conception and periodisation of capitalism, and seeking to trace the international consequences of its rise. 

    Defining capitalism

    There is of course ongoing disagreement about where and when capitalism began. Yet, for many involved in the discussion of origins, the dominant thesis to engage is that defended by Robert Brenner and Ellen M. Wood. Theirs was a thesis elaborated in large part as a response to Wallerstein’s, whose definition of capitalism as “production for profit via exchange,”7Robert Brenner, “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” (<)em(>)New Left Review(<)/em(>), no. I/104 (August 1977): 32. offered little to prevent scholars from identifying its rise in fourteenth-century Renaissance Italy, thirteenth-century medieval European cities, or even 5,000 years ago.8Giovanni Arrighi, (<)em(>)The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times(<)/em(>), New and Updated Edition (London : New York, NY: Verso, 2010); Braudel, (<)em(>)Civilisation Matérielle, Économie, et Capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe Siécle(<)/em(>); Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., (<)em(>)The Cambridge History of Capitalism: Volume 1: The Rise of Capitalism: From Ancient Origins to 1848(<)/em(>), vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Andre Gunder Frank, (<)em(>)The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?(<)/em(>) (Hoboken: Routledge, 1993). The starting point for Brenner and Wood was therefore to identify a more specific definition that would clearly situate capitalism as a historical phenomenon and so avoid “naturalizing” it as something eternal (and possibly insurmountable). To that end, they sought to re-center the issues of production and class relations. In their view, what defined capitalism was the fact that 

    producers depend on the market for access to the means of production (unlike, for instance, peasants, who remain in direct, non-market possession of land); while appropriators cannot rely on “extra-economic” powers of appropriation by means of direct coercion—such as the military, political, and judicial powers that enable feudal lords to extract surplus labor from peasants—but must depend on the purely “economic” mechanisms of the market.9Ellen Meiksins Wood, (<)em(>)The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View(<)/em(>) (Verso, 2017), 6. 

    This definition is much narrower than Wallerstein’s, excluding slave labor from its purview and opening up the possibility of multiple co-existing modes of production. One common criticism is precisely that it is too narrow, because it excludes many widespread types of labor related to production (including slavery) and reproduction. 

    In turn, the problem these critics face is that the more they have tried to expand the scope of relations that fall under the ambit of “capitalism,” the more the possibility of a clear definition recedes. In any case, on the basis of the above (narrower) definition, the rise of capitalism was identified in the fifteenth-century English countryside—a process completed by the seventeenth century at the heart of which we find the landed aristocracy, tenant farmers, and free wage laborers.10Robert Brenner, “Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,” (<)em(>)Past & Present(<)/em(>), no. 70 (1976): 30–75; Brenner, “The Origins of Capitalist Development”; Wood, (<)em(>)The Origin of Capitalism(<)/em(>). Since capitalism is here typically linked to a local or more often state-level property (i.e. England is a capitalist state, whereas for Wallerstein capitalism defines the world-system, not a specific state), a flurry of subsequent works adopting this definition have made it their object to identify the transition to capitalism in other countries or, in a different vein, to identify the international conditions that enabled its emergence in England.11See e.g. Xavier Lafrance, (<)em(>)The Making of Capitalism in France: Class Structures, Economic Development, the State and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1750-1914(<)/em(>) (Haymarket Books, 2020); Alex Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, (<)em(>)How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism(<)/em(>) (Pluto Press, 2015). But for my purposes, the most important offshoot of the Brenner-Wood thesis is one that has sought to grasp the relationship between this definition of capitalism and the nature of the international order. 

    The landmark work that adopted the Brenner-Wood definition of capitalism in the context of the states-system is Benno Teschke’s Myth of 1648. In Teschke’s account, the emergence of capitalism in early modern England led to a gradual shift away from dynastic towards de-personalized, parliamentary sovereignty, crystallized after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. As a result, Britain became the first “modern” state, removing itself from petty dynastic politics obsessed with rank and prestige, and adopting an explicit policy of “balancing” instead, thereby neutralizing threats from the continent. It also gained new institutions, such as the Bank of England (and the national debt), which allowed it to bring incredible financial pressure to bear on its continental rivals. Teschke argues that in Europe international relations were “modernizing” from 1688 to the First World War—and in the rest of the world until the mid-twentieth century.12Benno Teschke, (<)em(>)The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations(<)/em(>), Second edition (Verso, 2009 [2003]). Teschke explains that this ‘processual’ view is what distinguishes his account from Justin Rosenberg’s earlier work. See Justin Rosenberg, (<)em(>)Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations(<)/em(>) (Verso, 1994). This means that all states were forced to respond to the economic and military might that “modern” states brought to bear against them. This adaptation took place through a process of geopolitically combined and socio-politically uneven development, out of which modern international relations were eventually produced.

    Teschke’s study concludes that “the formation of a territorially fragmented states-system preceded capitalism” such that “there is no constitutive or genetic link between capitalism and a geopolitical pluriverse.”13Teschke, (<)em(>)Myth of 1648(<)/em(>), 145. For a sense of the intra-Marxist theoretical debate, see Alex Callinicos, “Does Capitalism Need the State System?,” (<)em(>)Cambridge Review of International Affairs(<)/em(>) 20, no. 4 (2007): 533–49; Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher, “The Changing ‘Logics’ of Capitalist Competition,” (<)em(>)Cambridge Review of International Affairs(<)/em(>) 20, no. 4 (2007): 565–80. In other words, it is not possible, as Wallerstein and others would have it, to derive the problems posed by our existence within a competitive system of states from the allegedly “more fundamental” issue of global capitalism. A system of states without capitalism is not just theoretically possible, but a real historical occurrence. Rather than tracing the origins of global developments to the international functioning of capitalism, we ought, according to Teschke, make room for the pressures exerted by a “geopolitical pluriverse.”

    International ordering beyond the state system

    What happens if we consider the origins of the other side of the equation—the system of states? The works considered above describe the modern international order as a system of states emerging sometime in early modern Europe. But over the last two decades, IR scholars, international historians and international lawyers have subjected this “early modern thesis” to sustained criticism. Several accounts now identify the birth of this system of states much later, in the long nineteenth century. David Armitage for instance argues that “the creation of a world of states has been largely the work of the last two centuries,” while Andreas Osiander claims that “nothing akin to what we call the state existed” prior to the nineteenth century, and Jordan Branch, that “sovereign territorial statehood was […] constructed out of the ruins of Napoleonic Europe.”14David Armitage, (<)em(>)Foundations of Modern International Thought(<)/em(>) (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 48; Andreas Osiander, “Culture, Change and the Meaning of History: Reflections on Richard Lebow’s New Theory of International Relations,” (<)em(>)Millennium(<)/em(>) 38, no. 1 (2009): 138; Andreas Osiander, (<)em(>)Before the State: Systemic Political Change in the West from the Greeks to the French Revolution(<)/em(>) (Oxford University Press, 2007); Jordan Branch, “Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change,” (<)em(>)International Organization(<)/em(>) 65, no. 01 (2011): 19.  Relatedly, legal historian David Kennedy explains that while early modern jurists ‘rarely spoke of “sovereigns” at all’, their nineteenth century counterparts ‘placed the authority of sovereigns at the center of a reimagined legal order.’ David Kennedy, (<)em(>)Of War and Law(<)/em(>) (Princeton University Press, 2006), 61. Such arguments are not mere amendments to the traditional historical account. In so far as they do not identify any states-system in the preceding period, the language of statehood becomes quite unhelpful to make sense of world politics across large chunks of early modernity.

    In fact, identifying an international system of states assumes that international relations were increasingly imagined as relations between abstract legal persons called states, which recognized one another’s external and internal sovereignty. It elides the parallel rise of increasingly hierarchical imperial arrangements between Europe and the non-European world (which can hardly be said to resemble those of the emerging system of states in Europe), based not on sovereign equality but on the division of sovereignty.15Edward Keene, (<)em(>)Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics(<)/em(>) (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Martti Koskenniemi, (<)em(>)The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960(<)/em(>) (Cambridge University Press, 2004). Precisely for this reason, Keene describes two co-existing patterns of international order in the long nineteenth century: one dedicated to the broad principle of toleration and characterised by sovereign equality, and another dedicated to civilization and based on the divisibility of sovereignty. Precisely for this reason, many have noted that a system of sovereign states only came to cover the entire globe after decolonisation, i.e. around the time when Wallerstein is writing. 

    International relations, then, are rarely reducible to a single pattern of order. But one important, and underdiscussed, historical development did begin to give world politics an increasingly competitive flavor in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century—namely the birth of a “great power system.”16Hamish Scott, (<)em(>)The Birth of a Great Power System, 1740-1815(<)/em(>) (Routledge, 2014).

    Great power and great politics

    The very language of power in international politics admittedly began much earlier than in the eighteenth century. We can find discussions of “powers” in the fourteenth-century writings of people like Bartolus of Sassoferrato, in Giovanni Botero’s sixteenth-century Reason of State, or yet still in Henri de Rohan’s seventeenth-century Treatise of the interests of the princes and states of Christendome. Nevertheless, it was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that this language, and particularly the concept of a “great power,” became pervasive. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Abbé de Mably was identifying different “classes” of powers— great, middle, and small powers—while German cameralists like Gottfried Achenwall and British journalists like John Campbell were busy trying to measure this power, the former group inventing the discipline of Statistik for this very purpose.17Harm Klueting, (<)em(>)Die Lehre von der Macht der Staaten: Das aussenpolitische Machtproblem in der “politischen Wissenschaft” und in der praktischen Politik im 18. Jahrhundert(<)/em(>) (Duncker & Humblot, 1986). Thus, a form of international political thought in which power was the be-all and end-all of international relations became widespread. 

    This strand of thought was markedly different from that discussing “sovereign states.” Although both understood world politics in terms of relations between abstract persons (“states” or “powers”) instead of the more traditional focus on individuals (e.g. the Holy Roman Emperor, the Pope, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel), the language of power underlined inequality and military capabilities while that of “sovereign states” tended to stress equality and rights. Emer de Vattel’s oft-cited formula is a striking encapsulation of the latter: “A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.”18Emer de Vattel, (<)em(>)Le Droit Des Gens Ou Principes de La Loi Naturelle Appliqués à La Conduite & Aux Affaires Des Nations & Des Souverains.(<)/em(>), 2 vols. (London, 1758), 11. Eventually however, the languages of power and sovereignty were partially merged, producing a strikingly modern way of thinking about international politics, that is, one in which the world was populated by juridically equal sovereign states, of vastly different power.

    Perhaps unsurprisingly, the principle of sovereign equality coexisted uneasily with the language of power. From the Congress of Vienna (1815) onwards, the great powers carved out an exception to the principle of sovereign equality, laying claim to a specific set of privileges in shaping the very content of international law—including the right to determine legal limits to sovereignty by authorizing interventions.19Gerry J. Simpson, (<)em(>)Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order(<)/em(>) (Cambridge University Press, 2004). Part of the rationale here was that they were the ones most able to enforce international law (and they would indeed have specific duties in that respect), since military power was so unevenly distributed in the international system. To this day, these legal privileges constitute the central exception—built into the very structure of the United Nations Security Council—to sovereign equality. 

    The gradual emergence of an international system explicitly organized around power in the second half of the eighteenth century meant that military competition increased and with it, the potential for devastating wars. For this reason, the atavistic competition for power as well as the ensuing practice of acquiring territory and extinguishing international actors through war characterise the long nineteenth century far more than it does the early modern period.20Mlada Bukovansky, “The Altered State and the State of Nature: The French Revolution and International Politics,” (<)em(>)Review of International Studies(<)/em(>) 25, no. 2 (1999): 197–216; Tanisha M. Fazal, (<)em(>)State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation(<)/em(>) (Princeton University Press, 2007). Even in the nineteenth century, no unrestricted right to war seems to have existed however, see Hendrik Simon, (<)em(>)A Century of Anarchy?: War, Normativity, and the Birth of Modern International Order(<)/em(>) (Oxford University Press, 2024). This interpretation runs counter to some quite prominent social scientific accounts such as Charles Tilly’s, which depict early modern Europe as a cutthroat world that gave birth to modern states precisely because of the demands of war. For him and many others, ‘until recently only those states survived that held their own in war with other states.’21 Tilly, (<)em(>)Coercion, Capital and European States(<)/em(>), 63. And yet, recent scholarship notes that it is almost impossible to think of “any European actors destroyed because they were unable to defend themselves” prior to the French Revolution.22Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” (<)em(>)International Organization(<)/em(>) 55, no. 2 (2001): 278; Philip Gorski and Vivek Swaroop Sharma, “Beyond the Tilly Thesis: ‘Family Values’ and State Formation in Latin Christendom,” in (<)em(>)Does War Make States?: Investigations of Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology(<)/em(>), ed. Lars Bo Kaspersen and Jeppe Strandsbjerg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 98–124. Osiander notes the minor exception of a handful of Italian city-states in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. Before that time, conquest was widely “regarded as a dubious title to possession”—a rather different state of affairs from the nineteenth century.23Osiander, “The Westphalian Myth,” 262. Relatedly, notions of (<)em(>)terra (<)/em(>)(or(<)em(>) territorium(<)/em(>)) (<)em(>)nullius(<)/em(>) typically did not constitute valid legal justification for colonisation. On that debate, see Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Genealogy of Terra Nullius,” (<)em(>)Australian Historical Studies(<)/em(>) 38, no. 129 (2007): 1–15. It was largely after the French Revolution that the ‘word empire came into official use in western Europe outside the Holy Roman Empire’, taking on a new meaning that referred to ‘the conquest of lesser people.’ James Muldoon, (<)em(>)Empire and Order: The Concept of Empire, 800–1800(<)/em(>) (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 149. It was only at the dawn of the long nineteenth century that power increasingly became the measure of states’ rank, could grant them additional rights, and ultimately determined their very survival. In this new world, the acquisition of military capabilities was now at an absolute premium.

    The economic consequences of the great power system

    The rise of this great power system and the military competition it produced called for large amounts of capital.  However, states of the late eighteenth century were still largely embryonic, a fact often obscured after the nineteenth-century invention and retrojection of the concept of “absolutism” onto early modernity.24Nicholas Henshall, (<)em(>)The Myth of Absolutism: Change & Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy(<)/em(>) (Routledge, 2014). They had weak central governments, were unable to impose a uniform political and legal order, could only rely on very meagre police forces, and were typically riven by internal tariffs and multiple competing currencies. These fledgling states’ demand for capital was therefore met in large part by borrowing. To that end, they tapped into nascent networks of financiers that spanned the European continent. Established by families like the Barings and the Rothschilds to finance long-distance trade, these networks had only emerged in the late eighteenth century.25Stanley D. Chapman, (<)em(>)The Rise of Merchant Banking(<)/em(>) (Allen & Unwin, 1984); Quentin Bruneau, (<)em(>)States and the Masters of Capital: Sovereign Lending, Old and New(<)/em(>) (Columbia University Press, 2023). 

    At the same time, in France, a new noun emerged to designate this type of lender: le capitaliste. When it was coined, the term referred to “someone who supplied one or other of the branches of the French royal government with the capital they needed to fund the cost of war,” or more simply, “someone who invested in royal and public debt.”26Michael Sonenscher, (<)em(>)Capitalism: The Story behind the Word(<)/em(>) (Princeton University Press, 2022), 31–39. By the 1830s, French speakers were using yet another word to describe this system of war finance inherited from the second half of the eighteenth century, “when states and their rulers borrowed large sums of money to fund the sudden, often massive increase in government expenditure caused by war or the threat of war”: capitalisme.27Sonenscher, (<)em(>)Capitalism(<)/em(>), 67. 

    What was adamantly not included in this discussion were questions that pertained to labor. Those were typically framed in the context of debates about the “division of labor” inherent to “commercial society.” That problem was global almost in its very nature, and apparently much more difficult to solve than that of capital and capitalism in the eyes of early nineteenth century observers. Eventually, the two issues were cobbled together and subsumed under the label of capitalism. But as Michael Sonenscher has brilliantly argued, we may have lost something of great value in underwriting this merger.  

    In any case, for early nineteenth-century contemporaries, capitalism, that “sovereign of sovereigns” epitomized by merchant banking families like the Rothschilds, had been ushered in by the rapid development and explosion of sovereign debt. This itself depended on a growing sense that polities’ standing and their chances of survival were in the last instance determined by military power. In this world, fine words would indeed butter no parsnips. This became even truer after the French revolution and the destruction of ancien régime rules of international intercourse. Only a few decades later, the end of the Napoleonic Wars constituted a huge financial event. The enormous war indemnity imposed on France helped produce a truly international bond market and enshrine what contemporaries then called capitalism.

    Embedding capitalism in international society

    The nature of international political and legal order (whether it is a system of states or something else) is an independent constraint on humanity that we must recognise as separate from capitalism. As a result, any attempt to grasp the current global conjuncture that is entirely focused on the internal dynamics of capitalism fails to capture the full complexity of the forces at play.

    The very terms of the debate that pit capitalism against the states-system are inadequate. While once widely accepted, the assumption that the concept of “states-system” accurately and exhaustively describes the modern pattern of international order is too restrictive. The political and legal organization of international order cannot be reduced to a single logic; there are always multiple logics of international ordering at work in a given epoch, rarely playing in unison. The emergence of a states-system was a new way of ordering the world that took root in the long nineteenth century, but so too was the development of modern power politics and of a great power system. In its original, more restricted sense, capitalism was an outgrowth of this new mode of international ordering. 

    New patterns of international order such as the one I have just described are thus the source of profound economic change. On some level, we already know this to be intuitively true: isn’t it precisely for this reason that scholars and pundits discuss the impact of shifts in the balance of power, “hegemonic transitions,” and war on the world economy? From an analytical perspective, however, we should focus not about the rise and fall of a specific polity, or the consequence of a specific war. Instead, we should look to shifts in the very “texture” of international relations, shifts that exceed the impact of any single event or the aims of any single polity.

     How exactly we try to capture this changing “texture” of international relations is an open question for which there is no single answer. One possible path runs through the well-known notion of “embeddedness.” The global economy, just like the American economy, is embedded in a society, albeit one that we seldom think about but that many lawyers, historians and historically inclined International Relations scholars call “international society.”28For examples from different fields, see e.g. Hedley Bull, (<)em(>)The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics(<)/em(>), Third edition (Columbia University Press, 2002); Keene, (<)em(>)Beyond the Anarchical Society(<)/em(>); Evan Luard, (<)em(>)Types of International Society(<)/em(>) (Free Press, 1976); Erez Manela, “International Society as a Historical Subject,” (<)em(>)Diplomatic History(<)/em(>) 44, no. 2 (2020): 184–209; Yasuaki Onuma, “When Was the Law of International Society Born?,” (<)em(>)Journal of the History of International Law(<)/em(>) 2, no. 1 (2000): 1–66; Evgeny Roshchin, “(Un)Natural and Contractual International Society: A Conceptual Inquiry,” (<)em(>)European Journal of International Relations(<)/em(>) 19, no. 2 (2013): 257–79. To truly understand transformations of the global economy, we must grapple with the changing nature of the society within which it is embedded.
     



     


  2. The Chainsaw and the Miracle

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    On October 26, the right-populist president of Argentina, Javier Milei, won just over 40 percent of the vote in the country’s midterm elections. His party, La Libertad Avanza, increased its seats in the Chamber of Deputies and far outpaced the center-left Peronist opposition, which came away with only 34 percent. The results defied expectations amid a painful economic recession and an acute form of financial dependence on the United States. For Milei, they represent a clear mandate to continue his political experiment: turning Argentina into a laboratory for structural adjustment.

    Twenty days before the election, Milei launched his new book, La construcción del milagro: el caso argentino (which translates literally as The Construction of the Miracle: The Argentine Case), to a packed concert stadium in Buenos Aires. Under bright floodlights, to the sound of electric guitars and religious slogans, the president sang a total of nine cover songs—most of them 1980s rock anthems—accompanied by a “presidential band” that included two sons of the famous neoliberal economist Alberto Benegas Lynch, plus a bass drum that bore the face of Ludwig Von Mises. In Milei’s universe, the free market is a sacred precept and fiscal discipline a moral virtue. His “Argentine miracle” relies on a particular kind of salvation story, in which individual sacrifices are necessary for the greater good. 

    This fits with a growing economic consensus that has taken hold since the pandemic, in Argentina and elsewhere, which views austerity as synonymous with stability. During the Covid-19 crisis, increased public spending was unavoidable; but the fiscal expansion that saved lives (and businesses) has since restricted governments’ room for maneuver, leaving them more indebted, under pressure from the markets, and less able to pursue distributive policies. The global recovery has been asymmetrical. Consumption, which was initially restrained but later surged, combined with an unprecedented amount of financial liquidity to produce an inflationary cycle that hit countries with less monetary sovereignty the hardest. Extreme poverty grew, wealth became even more concentrated, and no political project managed to offer effective redress. 

    In this context, the pendulum began to swing erratically: the right became even more radicalized and emboldened, the left more moderate and defensive. As voters lost confidence in progressive policy solutions, the ideology of austerity-as-stability gained ground. Milei is just one of its iterations, yet he is distinguished by the scale of his ambitions and the extent of their international support. At the IMF’s Annual Meetings this year, President Kristalina Georgieva praised the results of his structural adjustment program—privatization, deep spending cuts, attempted dollarization—and stressed the need to “accompany[] the Argentine government on its difficult but necessary path.” At previous meetings Georgieva has even worn a lapel pin in the shape of a chainsaw: Milei’s signature emblem, representing his pledge to slash the public sector. The Argentine example is now being cited to prove that the IMF’s old doctrines are alive and well in 2025: state retrenchment, fiscal rectitude, unrestricted openness to financial flows. 

    Milei also has the firm backing of Donald Trump, who sees in this program an opportunity to expand US influence in Latin America and displace China from the regional stage. Under Secretary Scott Bessent, the US Treasury has become an operational actor in Argentine monetary policy: executing currency swaps, intervening in the foreign exchange market, and coordinating decisions with the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA). This kind of direct interference is unprecedented, and has placed the country’s economy under foreign tutelage.

    The “chainsaw” and the “miracle” have thus become metaphors for an emerging political order. One promises to destroy the state, the other to redeem it. Together they strike a precarious balance between ruination and hope, through which a new model of dependency is now being consolidated. By studying it closely, not just as a political emergency but as a reflection of broader global trends, we can better understand our present historical moment. 

    Monetarism reborn

    For Argentines, inflation is more than just a metric; it is a trauma. The hyperinflation of 1989 fundamentally reshaped everyday life. Salaries melted away between morning and afternoon; shops raised their prices two or three times a day; families rushed to the supermarket as soon as they got paid only to find that their money was no good. In the space of just a few months, the currency ceased to fulfill its basic function as a measure of trust. Memories of the stacks of bills needed to buy bread, or of retirees standing in endless lines, have served as a warning to every government since. 

    Convertibility promised to end the chaos by fixing the peso to the dollar at a one-to-one ratio. For a while it seemed to work: prices stabilized, credit returned, and consumption grew. But the side-effects were devastating, as debt soared and industry was dismantled. The illusion of stability was finally punctured by the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in 2001. To stop a run on the banks, the government embarked on what became known as the “corralito,” freezing deposits and confiscating the savings of millions of people—who responded by flooding the streets, banging pots and pans to demand their money back. The unrest led to the most profound institutional collapse since the return of democracy: a total of five presidents in two weeks. An entire generation came to feel that the state could break down at any moment, that a lifetime of sacrifice and savings could be snatched away from them. 

    Milei built his political profile on that fear. His claim that the fiscal deficit is the root of all evil has allowed him to reinstate the most orthodox pillar of monetarism: the need to lower inflation at any cost. “The problem is not poverty,” he repeats ad infinitum, “but the deficit.” On that basis, he has already abolished several government ministries, ripped up regulations, and cut thousands of public-sector jobs, and he is now pressing ahead with plans for yet more fiscal contraction. The 2026 budget is billed as “the smallest in the last thirty years,” reducing social spending, salaries, and subsidies to the provinces. The effect on the currency has been stark. Monthly inflation, which had exceeded 25 percent at the end of 2023—as a result of the sharp devaluation carried out by Economy Minister Luis Caputo the day after he took office—fell dramatically in 2025, and is now at its lowest level in seven years. But the fallout is the destruction of purchasing power and productive paralysis: a deadly combination of recession, depressed wages, and the transfer of resources from labor to financial income. 

    Under Milei, Argentina’s artificially sustained exchange rate has provided yet another illusion of stability, as well as an incentive for speculation. Thanks to positive real interest rates, foreign funds have returned to the country to take advantage of the carry trade, turning quick profits in pesos that can then be dollarized, with banks advising clients on exactly when to enter and leave the market. At the same time, the Central Bank’s reserves have been depleted, even as the government has procured loans and encouraged activities like asset laundering. The result is the return of a familiar paradox: stability in the markets, instability in the country at large. For the President and his supporters, though, this is nothing less than a shining example of monetary discipline, as the costs of inflation have been covered by cuts to wages and pensions. The state has attained a surplus not by producing more, but simply by no longer fulfilling its obligations, shifting the deficit problem onto households. Their pain is now a measure of economic progress, a step on the road to redemption. 

    New dependency

    Milei’s so-called miracle has two external architects: the IMF and the US Treasury. Both have found in him an exemplary student willing to follow to the letter a structural adjustment manual that most other leaders have tried to moderate. In April 2025, the IMF approved a new loan for Argentina well above its quota in the organization. The loan to President Mauricio Macri in 2018 had already reached a historic high, equivalent to 1,001% of the amount to which the country was officially entitled under the quota system. The new agreement, negotiated by the economy minister Luis Caputo, raised this figure to 1,500%, consolidating Argentina’s position as the country most indebted to the institution. 

    In the Fund’s jargon, this is considered “exceptional access:” loans that far exceed the limits permitted by regulations, but which can be approved if the IMF is satisfied that four basic conditions are met: sustainable debt, repayment capacity, low risk of contagion, and absence of political motivations. In this case the IMF described the loan as “accompanying a successful stabilization process.” In reality, though, the decision was clearly political. Several IMF directors warned that the Argentine economy—given its negative reserves and its lack of no growth or an approved budget—violated their criteria for exceptional access, and that the loan lacked adequate technical support. Yet these factors were seen as secondary, so long as the program could be used as a showcase for the IMF’s nueva austeridad. 

    Six months later, with the midterms campaign underway and a worrying run on the peso, Bessent announced a currency swap and US intervention in the Argentine foreign exchange market. Billed as a gesture of “support” for Milei, the move was actually much more than that: a transfer of monetary sovereignty from Buenos Aires to Washington. The latter bought pesos and influenced both interest rates and the exchange rate—trumpeting the supposed benefits of these policies in announcements that doubled as propaganda for Milei’s election campaign. Despite this, there are still no official reports or published conditions regarding this US support: a direct violation of Argentine debt law, which stipulates that all such agreements must pass through Congress.

    Meanwhile, Trump himself was busy rejigging the global financial system. Crossing swords with Jerome Powell over control of the Federal Reserve, he installed Daniel Katz—Bessent’s former chief of staff—as deputy managing director of the IMF. With that, the Fund became aligned with the Treasury’s agenda, forging a close alliance between the two institutions and the Milei government, in which the former increasingly oversaw the decisions of the latter. Trump warned Argentine voters against turning to Peronism, insisting that if Milei lost the upcoming elections, US financial support would be cut off. The midterm results suggest that this threat resonated with the public. 

    Now, when the elected deputies and senators take office this December, the domestic political situation is set to be reconfigured. Milei has expanded his representation in Congress as well as his influence over the parliamentary agenda—not quite eradicating the opposition, but weakening its ability to impose limits on his program. This coincides with the new phase of the IMF agreement, with a raft of reforms planned for pensions, labor laws, and taxes. There are rumours that the retirement age will rise to 70, the working day will be lengthened, and VAT will be reduced in order to transfer the burden of tax collection onto the provinces, with destructive consequences for the smallest and poorest ones. If such measures come to pass, they could transform the current period of adjustment into a new political settlement. 

    Dynamics of adjustment

    Structural adjustment is not just an economic tool but a technology of power. It works by distributing losses, deciding who must pay for stability. Since 2024, public spending in Argentina has fallen to unprecedented levels. Ministries have laid off more than 50,000 staff. Social programs have been reduced or eliminated altogether. Funding for the provinces has been frozen, while public works—roads, bridges, hospitals, schools—have come to a complete halt. In just a single year, the state has ceased to be an employer, a provider, or a guarantor of rights. It has become little more than an auditor of misery. 

    Pensioners were the first ones in the crosshairs: moratoriums were suspended, minimum pensions were reduced from their already low level, and pension spending fell by more than 30 percent in real terms, according to data from the Ministry of Economy. Next were women and young people. With the fall in consumption and the closure of small and medium-sized enterprises, low-wage jobs—in areas like retail, services, and care—either disappeared or became even more precarious. Domestic work, one of the main sources of employment for women, was one of the most affected sectors, depriving many households of their only source of income. Care policies were rolled back, and community spaces from soup kitchens to cafeterias were defunded. For most people under the age of 30, the only gateway to the labor market is delivery, transportation, or service platforms. Their workday is ruled by an algorithm and their income tied to the fluctuations of demand, with social security non-existent. Their educational opportunities have been further slashed by Milei’s chainsaw, as public universities have faced real-terms budget cuts of 35 percent, and disciplines like science, technology, and culture have been subsumed into the category of “unproductive spending.” Scholarships have been frozen, research projects halted, and academics forced to emigrate. 

    People with disabilities are yet another target. In August, the Disability Emergency Law—offering higher pensions and welfare entitlements to the disabled, and approved by a large majority in Congress—was vetoed by Milei, who made no attempt to conceal his preference for fiscal rules over social justice. The public response was overwhelming: large numbers of protesters mobilized for months on end to demand the instatement of the benefits, holding street demonstrations and ambushing senior politicians. Lawmakers were eventually forced to step in and override the President, who grudgingly allowed the bill to pass, but has paused its implementation. 

    Though Milei’s list of victims is long, they are barely noticed at international forums, where the only economy that is analyzed and debated is the financial one, with success measured in terms of inflation and country risk rather than jobs or industrial production. As GDP falls, the Merval index rises; as consumption plummets, Argentine bonds appreciate. The gap between macro and micro widens every month.

    Real miracles

    Argentina’s structural adjustment follows a logic of disconnection, in three important respects. First, there is a division between finance and everyday life, as the demands of one are secured through a slow, sometimes almost invisible deterioration of the other: wages lose purchasing power penny by penny, services increase a little more each month, projects are postponed, future prospects shrink. There is no sudden, spectacular crisis, but rather a continuous process of loss that gradually becomes naturalized, like a change in the weather.

    Second, there is a disconnection between the two currencies that underpin this program, since the dollars that enter the country do not stay there; they are used to pay off debts, fuel the financial cycle, or finance the import of cheap trinkets that do nothing to expand local production or employment. Stability is therefore bought by external flows that could dry up at any moment if the mood of the market changes. This fragile peace is sustained by resources that do not stimulate the real economy, but rather buy time for the government.

    The third disconnection is between external and domestic debt. What the state saves vis-à-vis the IMF is transferred from households to banks. Families resort to credit to pay for services, rent, or food. Small businesses use loans, formal or informal, to stay afloat. External debt becomes private debt, commitments to foreign creditors become commitments to the supermarket or the virtual wallet. And therein lies the real miracle: not that inflation has been curbed and finance reinvigorated, but that the Argentine economy somehow manages to keep going even as it destroys the social base on which it depends. This is a miracle of survival rather than development—a “recovery” built on the sweat and exhaustion of those who are forced to work harder, or produce more, or care for dependents who are neglected by the state. Milei’s model shows that contemporary capitalism no longer needs to produce in order to dominate. Its new lords—the techno-elite who shuttle between Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and who profit off the dependency of the South—do not compete for labor or land. Their role is simply to manage scarcity. 

  3. Plastic Planet

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    The Polycrisis has always taken an interest in fossil fuels. We have written about how the industry has shaped international climate diplomacy and liberal politics. We’ve looked at the dynamics of the mid-transition, where fossil-fuel interests are fighting a desperate rear-guard struggle to secure future demand, even as the growth era for fossil fuels is ending (as many producers, investors and forecasters acknowledge). We’ve published on the new decline in natural gas and in oil demand. But not all oil is burned. A lot is simply feedstock for the petrochemical industry to churn out plastics. And the industry has long seen plastics as its saviour from their nightmare world where electric cars crush oil demand. 

    For this edition of the Polycrisis, we asked Venus Bivar, who is professor of environmental history at Oxford, to analyze the petrochemicals and plastics industry. She has written about how the joint crisis of rising economic inequality and climate change is shaping a new generation of intellectual work. Her forthcoming book is on the political ecology of postwar Marseille at the intersection of petrochemical-driven economic development, decolonization, and environmental degradation. — Kate Mackenzie and Tim Sahay

    Three years ago, the United Nations Environment Assembly adopted a resolution to negotiate a legally-binding treaty to regulate plastics pollution. Representatives from 184 countries were tasked with participating in a series of five rounds of negotiation to advance towards a binding agreement. When the delegates failed to arrive at an agreement during the fifth and final round, which took place in November 2024 in Busan, an overtime session was scheduled for the following summer. In August of this year, delegates met once again, this time in Geneva, and once more failed to secure an agreement. Another meeting is scheduled for early 2026, but will be restricted to administrative matters; there are currently no plans for how and when negotiations on regulation will resume.

    The disagreement that led to the collapse of the talks lies between delegates who are advocating for improvements in waste management, and delegates who are advocating for curbs on production. The former represent nations with vested interests in petrochemicals —chief among them, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United States—while the latter represent a broad coalition of nations, many of which have been on the receiving end of the plastic-pollution crisis. These include Panama, Kenya, and Norway. At stake, on the one hand, is a multi-billion-dollar industry, and on the other, the health of the planet and all who live here.

    The influence of the lobbyists from the petrochemicals sector is not to be underestimated. Julien Gupta, a freelance journalist, reported that at the third round of treaty negotiations in Nairobi, there were 143 registered lobbyists from the industry, and many more unregistered. The Centre of Environmental International Law has estimated that 234 fossil-fuel and chemical-industry lobbyists were present at the full cycle of negotiations—outnumbering national delegations, indigenous representatives, and scientists. The latter had difficulty securing limited registration spots.

    The lobbyists are fighting to protect the ability of plastics producers to keep on producing. In 2024, the global market was valued at USD 523.48 billion; it is projected to grow to 754.23 billion by 2032. Petroleum is a feedstock for plastics production: 98 percent of all plastics produced globally are derived from fossil fuels. Of the top five plastics producers in the world, four are petro companies: Sinopec, ExxonMobil, Saudi Aramco, and PetroChina (LyondellBasell, a chemicals company, ranks third). 

    A Sankey diagram depicting where fossil fuel feedstocks are used in the petrochemical sector. (Source: Levi & Cullen)

    As the push for an energy transition continues, fossil-fuel firms are looking to diversify their revenue streams, and developing their plastics departments is proving to be highly lucrative. Petrochemicals—the sector of the oil and gas industry that produces materials and inputs downstream of petroleum—is expected to account for more than a third of the growth in oil demand by 2030, and nearly half of the growth by 2050. Needless to say, the petrochemical firms’ sustainability agenda consists of advocating for recycling, rather than production curbs. 

    Pollution north and south 

    Every year, over 400 million tons of plastic are produced. This plastic is used to make a wide variety of products, from lightweight aeronautics components to food packaging. While some essential sectors, particularly medicine, rely on plastics to deliver life-saving technologies, most of the plastic that is produced could be replaced by less deadly materials. Half of annual production is used to manufacture single-use items, like soda bottles, balloons, wet wipes, and food wrappers. At the current rate, global plastic pollution is estimated to triple by 2040.

    Producers and Importers of Plastic (Source: Plastic Waste Transparency Project, Basel Action Network)

    Seventy-five countries involved in the plastic treaty negotiations have come together under the banner of the High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution. Their number one priority is to decrease the amount of new plastic that is being produced. But despite representing 40 percent of the negotiating countries, they have been unable to realize even a modest commitment to reduction; oil-producing participants insisted early in the treaty process that all decisions would require a consensus opinion. As long as the consensus requirement is in place, it is impossible for the negotiations to meaningfully address the plastics crisis.  

    The environmental consequences of plastics production are nothing short of catastrophic. Less than 10 percent of all plastics that go into waste streams are recycled. Because of their chemical composition, plastics are extremely difficult to recycle—and of those few recyclable plastics, they can only be recycled once, downcycled into lower-quality and disposable plastics.  The 90 percent of plastics that are not recycled are incinerated, landfilled, or sold to processors. None of these disposal methods are safe. While more sophisticated incineration facilities have filters to limit the amount of toxic fumes that are released into the atmosphere, incineration in poorer countries releases highly toxic dioxins, mercury, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Plastics in landfills emit gas as they degrade and leach into the groundwater and soil. Waste-management facilities in the global South are overwhelmed by the detritus of Northern mass consumption. 

    Countries like the Philippines, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia have become major importers of plastic waste. In wealthy countries, sorting and recycling plastic is expensive, often more so than simply producing new plastic. But in developing countries, where wages are low, the economics of recycling are more favorable. So wealthy countries export their waste, relieving stress from their own over-burdened waste systems, and firms in poorer ones import it for sorting, repurposing, or elimination. Much of it is  incinerated in the open air, or illegally dumped on roadsides, in fields, and waterways.

    Big Oil and the plastics industry deceived the public for decades and caused the plastic waste crisis (Source: Center for climate integrity) 

    For the geographer Max Liboiron, a system that seeks to manage rather than eliminate  environmental pollution should best be described as colonialism—a system that grants a colonizer access to land for its goals. The plastics industry, dominated by single-use products whose physical life lasts centuries, exemplifies the idea of colonial sacrifice zones, from the Kisumu landfill in Kenya to the Mekong River.

    Convergence 

    While plastics pollution threatens every square inch of the planet, it is the oceans that have become ground zero for the fight against disposability. Approximately 10 million tonnes of plastic enter the oceans every single year. Autopsies reveal the stomachs of sea birds and sharks to contain the discards of a human civilization drunk on plastic disposability. The Pacific Garbage Patch has become a ubiquitous referent for an ailing planet.

    Just as the Earth’s waters have become contaminated with plastic pollution, so too have our bodies. Earlier this year, research scientists dominated the headlines with the finding that human brains may contain up to seven grams of plastic (the same amount that goes into the making of a small plastic spoon). And it’s not just our brains. Microplastics (smaller than 5mm in diameter) have been found in human lungs, testicals, livers, kidneys, bone marrow, and placentas. All told, plastics contain more than 13,000 chemicals, many of which are highly toxic; these include flame retardants, PFASs, phthalates, and bisphenols. We ingest these chemicals in the plastic-infused dust that we breathe, the water that we drink, and the food that we prepare with plastic utensils or eat from plastic containers. While research on the effects of plastic contamination is still in its early stages, there is compelling evidence to suggest that plastics might contribute to hormonal anomalies and reproductive issues. 


    At the dawn of the plastic age, in the 1950s, Lloyd Stouffer, the editor of Modern Packaging magazine, declared that “the future of plastics is in the trash can.” He was pushing the industry to increase revenues by moving toward products with shorter use spans. Little did he know how prescient his remark would be. Seventy years later, the trash cans have spilled over into the soil, the water, and the flesh of every living being on Earth. And there is little sign that things are slowing down, in spite of the efforts of good-faith actors who are participating in the plastics treaty negotiations. As fossil-fuel companies face the existential threat that is the transition to renewable energy, they are doubling down on plastics production. In 2024, the plastics industry in the United States invested a staggering 17.5 billion USD in new facilities and equipment.

  4. Mamdani’s First Budget

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    New York City lends itself to superlatives. The largest local government in the US by a wide margin, the City spends more each year than the next ten largest city governments combined; its $121 billion dwarfs Los Angeles’s $19 billion, Chicago’s $10 billion, and Buffalo’s $1.7 billion. NYC’s Department of Education enrolls more students than LA and Chicago put together, while the size of the NYPD exceeds the combined numbers of the next four largest police departments. As a result, the City’s mayor has far more responsibility than any other local elected official in the country.

    The origins of this unique arrangement lie not only in NYC’s giant population—now at 8.5 million—but also in the unusually consolidated state of its taxing authority and public services. Whereas other American cities tend to divide essential services between the city, the county, and the school board, in NYC the city government covers virtually all public services in the five boroughs: public schools, universities, hospitals, policing, social welfare, children’s services, and sanitation. This sprawling range of costly commitments is generally thought to be a liability for the incumbent mayor, who inevitably faces intense pressure to balance the budget. (Indeed, the last time one was elected to a subsequent public office was 1869.) At the same time, though, the mayor can use these vast fiscal resources and this high degree of institutional centralization to pursue ambitious policy agendas—potentially reshaping the City itself. 

    In January 2026, Zohran Mamdani will release his first budget proposal, the Preliminary Budget, which will strive to implement at least some of the radical policy pledges that animated his election campaign: free buses, universal childcare, a rent freeze for stabilized tenants, and new affordable housing. In February, he will go to Albany to advocate these measures during the state legislature’s budget negotiations. To push them through, he will have to overcome deep-seated anxieties about “overspending” which have long influenced the City’s budget process, and which will be compounded by new risks to federal funding, as Donald Trump threatens to wage financial warfare on the incoming administration. To measure Mamdani’s chances of success, we must take a closer look at the constraints and opportunities of the City’s unique public spending model. 

    The City’s largest spending obligations: teachers, police, and transfer payments

    At first glance, NYC’s recent fiscal history seems like a relatively simple story: both revenues and expenditures have grown continually. On the revenue side, this is largely because of the upward trend in the City’s GDP, thanks in part to population growth. But while City expenditures have kept pace with revenues, they have lagged behind the growth of private incomes and spending—which means that as a share of the local economy, the public sector has actually been shrinking for years.

    Where is this public money being allocated? In fiscal year 2025, which ended on June 30, New York City spent $120.8 billion. The three largest departments, responsible for 60 percent of the total, were education, police, and social services. In fourth place, at 6 percent, was debt servicing; hundreds of other departments comprise the remaining 33 percent, or $40 billion. Of the total budget, less than half ($56.9 billion, or 47 percent) is attributable to the direct employment of 302,000 workers, while the rest is spent on other services, including transfer payments, the operation of city property and physical assets, and debt service.1New York City Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2026 Adopted Budget Financial Plan (July 2025).

    The New York City Department of Education (DOE) provides for all public preschool through twelfth grade education in the City, running its public schools and universal prekindergarten program, funding charter schools, and providing support services. In the 2023–24 school year, which provides the most recent data available, the DOE enrolled more than 1 million children: 938,000 in K-12 and 95,000 three- and four-year-olds in prekindergarten.2https://data.nysed.gov/enrollment.php?instid=7889678368; https://www.nysed.gov/early-learning/prekindergarten-data In doing so, the Department employed 133,500 full-time staff—nearly half (47 percent) of the City’s entire direct workforce. In fiscal year 2024, the Department spent $33 billion. After accounting for an additional $10 billion in pension and benefit costs, the City’s education system accounts for 36 percent of the City’s total budget—up from 26 percent in 2014.

    Education has driven the City’s spending growth over the last decade. Despite popular frustrations with allegedly unfocused spending growth under Mayor Bill de Blasio, his administration in fact channeled new expenditures into public education. This funding allowed the City to add two grade levels to the public school system: 3-K and pre-kindergarten, which offer universal education to three- and four-year-olds, respectively. Even without new taxes, a City government committed to spending its existing revenues is able to do a lot: the steady revenue growth was enough to fund two-thirds of this expansion of the public sector, with the remainder coming from Albany.

    New York City expenditures and workforce, fiscal year 2025

    AgencySpending (billions)Percent of all spendingWorkersPercent of City workforce
    Education$43.936%133,50047%
    Social Services$18.515%12,6004%
    Police$11.09%46,40016%
    Debt service$7.06%——
    All other$40.333%93,90033%

    By contrast, the growth of the City’s two other major spending programs—social services and police—lagged total city spending over the same period. The Department of Social Services (DSS) is the City’s second largest agency by spending and fourth largest by employment. The Department’s two major units—the Human Resources Administration and Department of Homeless Services—administer a broad range of social assistance programs, including cash assistance, rental assistance, and shelters and other homeless services. DSS also manages enrollment in Medicaid and SNAP, though the benefits are not part of the City’s budget. Because DSS’s work primarily involves transfer payments, its spending runs far ahead of its workforce: the Department’s $18.5 billion budget accounted for 15 percent of City spending, while its 12,600 workers made up just 4 percent of the municipal workforce.

    The Police Department is the City’s third largest department by spending and second largest by employment. In contrast to the DSS, the Police Department’s work is labor-intensive: its $11 billion budget is 9 percent of the City total while its 46,400 employees constitute 16 percent of the City workforce. Of these employees, about 33,000 are uniformed officers, while 13,200 are civilians. Finally, when it comes to debt service, the City made $7 billion in payments this fiscal year, supporting its $103 billion in outstanding debt. 

    Revenues: stability or stagnation?

    New York City’s government spending is funded by a broader set of revenue sources than the typical US city. Personal and business income is taxed for its resident people and corporations, in addition to the property and sales (ad valorem) tax that traditionally define the revenue base of municipal corporations. The largest single revenue source, the property tax, brought in $35 billion during the 2025 fiscal year. Crucially, this is the only revenue source collected under the exclusive discretion of the City, whereas changes to any other taxes must be approved by the State legislature. Together, these two authorities control local taxes that account for 72 percent of the City’s revenue. As for the remainder, New York State provides $20.9 billion and Washington, D.C. $11 billion: a combined 26 percent. State and federal funding consists of categorical grants tied to specific programs: state funding is predominantly school aid, while federal funding consists of a broader range of social assistance, housing, and education-related block grants.

    New York City revenue, fiscal year 2025

    Revenue sourceRevenue (billions)Percent of total
    Total revenue$120.8100%
    – City funds$87.172%
    – – Total tax$80.467%
    – – – Property$34.729%
    – – – Sales$11.29%
    – – – Income$16.013%
    – – – Business$13.611%
    – – – Other tax$4.94%
    – – Other city funds$6.76%
    – Federal$11.09%
    – State$20.917%
    – Other$1.71%

    The City’s revenue system is geared toward stability rather than growth. The mix of taxes that fund the City generate predictable, stable growth, while failing to fully capture drivers of its economy. While this has allowed it to maintain services through economic oscillations, it has done so by keeping the level of services lower than what they otherwise would have been had revenues maintained pace with the growth of the local economy. 

    Between 2008 and 2025, the City’s GDP rose by 155 percent to $1.5 trillion. This economic growth has been faster than the City’s revenues, which grew from $60 to $120 billion. Had revenue growth kept pace with the growth of local incomes and private spending, it would be $24 billion larger than it was in fiscal year 2025, or $144.8 billion. Property tax is the only tax that has kept pace with GDP, whereas the City’s other taxes have lagged behind it. While a responsive tax system would have adapted to capture growth across various dimensions of economic activity, in NYC its control by the state has kept it relatively static amid a changing economy. 

    The relative stability of the City’s revenue system—allowing tax assessments below market values—thus prevents spending from growing, easing fiscal management when market values fall. But the logic of this approach is contractionary: between 2007 and 2025, the city’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.1 percent while city revenues grew at just 4.1 percent. Sales and business tax growth, 3.1 and 3.4 percent annually, dragged down the 5.6 percent growth in property tax revenue. The rise in property values, which have grown much faster than any other measure of the economy, is not fully reflected in tax appraisals. 

    “The City has traditionally assessed real property at less than market value,” explains the Official Statement of the City’s recent bond issues. The total value of New York City’s real estate tax assessments has been just 20 percent of full market value for the last decade, and it was even lower during the Bloomberg years.3According to the State of New York’s Office of Real Property Tax Services, within the Department of Finance. While the entirety of New York City’s taxable real estate is worth some $1.58 trillion today, just $309 billion of this is liable for paying city property taxes. The failure of revenue to keep pace with economic growth eroded the size of the public sector relative to the City’s economy, from 9.6 percent in 2007 to 8.1 percent in 2025.

    Sluggish growth in tax revenues was the result of policy choices: the sales tax base has been steadily eroded as the tax only applies to goods, while nationally spending on services has grown far faster amid the digital transformation of the economy. The City’s business taxes, meanwhile, were reformed in 2015 to conform with corporate tax cuts passed by New York State, prompting a sharp near-term decrease in revenue.

    The budget dance

    The Mayor’s office also traditionally under-projects revenues, forecasting figures well below a reasonable anticipated intake. This is, in part, a longstanding fiscal management practice: projecting muted revenue growth hedges the budget against economic downturns, reducing the need to cut services if or when they do materialize. This in turn helps the Mayor to exercise control over the fifty-one-member City Council, setting priorities to which political negotiations must adjust. Yet the practice has broader political implications when it comes to the public’s understanding of the city’s fiscal situation. Its effect has been to obscure the real drivers of expenditure growth and stoke anxiety about the City’s ability to balance the books. 

    The City’s budget process consists of four projections each fiscal year concerning revenues and expenditures for the current and next two fiscal years. This continuous process begins in January with the Mayor’s Preliminary Budget, which is the basis for the Mayor and City Council to negotiate spending commitments for the coming fiscal year. These are revised in the May Executive Budget and codified in the Adopted Budget the City Council passes in June before the beginning of the fiscal year. In the interim, the November “Mod” (modified budget) updates revenue projections on the basis of the prior year’s actuals.This budget process always projects deficits—spending above revenues—in future years. 

    The process wherein these gaps are narrowed and, in negotiation with the City Council, new spending is allocated is occasionally referred to as “the budget dance.” It has become far more dramatic in recent years, and it will be decisive in understanding how the Mamdani administration will govern.

    With striking consistency, Bill de Blasio’s two administrations projected third-year budget gaps that, on average, amounted to 6.1 percent of projected revenue between fiscal years 2013 and 2022. Actual revenue, however, exceeded forecasts by an average 6.4 percent over the same period, closing the forecast gaps. Spending forecasts were generally very close to mark—the City can and did forecast its spending commitments accurately.

    During the Adams administration, however, the budget dance has become more dramatic and complex, obfuscating spending priorities and the City’s fiscal trajectory. Compared to the 2010s, actual revenues have consistently come in above revenue forecasts. This began, understandably, with the onset of the Covid pandemic before Adams was even elected. The fiscal year 2021 and 2022 executive budget proposals were published in April 2020 and 2021, respectively. Unprecedented federal aid and strong tax receipts spurred annual revenue growth of 5.5 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively. This exceeded prior-year expectations by 9 and 18 percent, respectively. But revenue forecasts under Adams have remained significantly more pessimistic than even cautious pre-Covid projections: the fiscal year 2023 through 2025 executive budgets underestimated revenue in the ensuing year by an average of 14 percent—an error rate three times higher than the pre-Covid average. There is a broad recognition that the City has made excessive pessimism a matter of policy. 

    As a result of unduly pessimistic revenue forecasts, the City’s spending plans have also become increasingly unmoored from reality. This has come in two forms, each with their own political utility: underbudgeting and overbudgeting spending. Their combined effect has been far more confounding than merely austerity. Budgeting spending too low creates political fictions as the fiscal year progresses. Because state law requires the current fiscal year’s Adopted Budget to balance, higher-than-expected revenue always pushes the City budgets into a de facto surplus. As this surplus is spent, the Mayor and politicos across the country are able to paint a picture of overspending as a justification for cutting services—the politics of the dance. 

    Disposal of the surplus allows the Mayor to shape perceptions. In fiscal years 2021 and 2022, for example, higher-than-expected revenue pushed spending higher. Most of this spending accrued to the Department of Education (DOE), which faced the costs of the implementing of remote learning.  While much of this spending became tied to recurring costs throughout the pandemic, the Adams administration did not “baseline” these new costs into its spending forecasts—the DOE could be accused of persistently spending above budget. Similarly, in social services the City expanded eligibility and benefit levels for CityFHEPS, which provides rental vouchers for New Yorkers facing homelessness. Cash assistance caseloads also rose during the pandemic and have remained elevated. The City has not appropriately budgeted for these social services costs, which exceeded projections by $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2025. Another practice with a similar effect is called the “surplus roll,” in which the City dispenses its surplus by prepaying subsequent year expenses. In fiscal year 2025, for instance, the City accrued a $3.8 billion surplus. It booked this as 2025 spending in the form of prepaying spending liabilities in fiscal year 2026. Total spending for fiscal year 2025 came in above budget by $3.8 billion, but this prepayment was entirely responsible for the image of above-expectations spending.4Two further areas of overbudgeting are not new. First, the City has a longstanding practice of including a in-year reserves in each year’s budget. These reserves are unallocated spending—that is, a line item that inflates total budgeted spending but is not tied to a specific use. At the end of the year, these reserves contribute to the annual surplus. In recent years, these reserves have totaled $1.45 billion per year. Second, the City typically spends less than budgeted on debt service, which is based on highly conservative expectations.

    Reestimates of New York City’s fiscal year 2025 spending and revenue between June 2024 and June 2025 (figures in millions)

    Unspent budgeted funds
    Asylum seekers$1,900
    Personnel costs$1.4
    In-year reserves5Unallocated spending: a line item that inflates total budgeted spending but is not tied to a specific use. At the end of the year, these reserves contribute to the annual surplus.$1,450
    Debt service$455
    All other$930
    Spending above budget
    Social services$2,200
    Education$670
    Police & Fire$900
    All other$2,400
    Net effect on total spending$87 over budget
    Revenue reestimates$3,900 above forecast
    Year-end surplus$3,800

    Budgeting spending too high—in effect, masking the future surpluses—allows for similar claims at the beginning, rather than the end, of each fiscal year. In fiscal year 2024, for example, the City began dramatically increasing its expected spending on asylum seekers amid an influx of migrants. These projected costs proved to be exaggerated: the City’s fiscal year 2025 costs came $1.9 billion below expectations—55 percent lower than the $3.4 billion anticipated at the beginning of the fiscal year. 

    High vacancies across the public workforce since the beginning of the Covid pandemic have had a similar effect. The number of public workers fell early in the pandemic, from 302,000 in June 2020 to 281,000 in April 2023. The size of the workforce has recovered modestly to about 286,000 by June 2025. The vacancy rate remains above 5 percent. The highest number of vacancies were at the largest agencies: Education and Police with 4,600 and 3,000 vacancies, respectively; however, their vacancy rates were 3 and 6 percent, not much different from the City as a whole. The highest vacancy rates among major agencies were the departments of Probation and Correction, with 24 and 16 percent, respectively. Administrative Services (16 percent vacancy), Housing Preservation and Development (14 percent), Finance (14 percent) also face very high vacancy, jeopardizing basic city functioning.

    Through all this the City did not reduce its budgeted staff. The lack of spending on unfilled but budgeted positions, together with lower-than-anticipated pension contributions, generated substantial underspending in recent years, including $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2025.

    If disposal of the surplus allows the Mayor to claim certain foreseeable obligations are in fact evidence of irresponsibility, so too does it allow the Mayor to set political priorities. Overtime pay for the Police and Fire Departments in NYC is not new, for example, though it has grown dramatically in recent years. While the City has long underbudgeted overtime wages for uniformed workers, in fiscal year 2025 the $900 million margin was about twice the pre-Covid norm.

    Fiscal crises past and future

    In recent years there have been rolling anxieties about the City’s fiscal condition. Between the onset of the Covid pandemic and Donald Trump’s re-election as president, there was much talk of so-called “fiscal cliffs:” the inevitable spending cuts needed when the City exhausted funding for recurring but unbudgeted costs associated with expanding social services and education. In the end, though, this problem failed to materialize, because revenue exceeded projections by greater margins than in the past—underpinned by continuing economic growth. 

    Now, just as the City appears set for a soft fiscal landing, there is a new source of panic: the withdrawal of federal funding by the Trump administration. Such fears proved unfounded under Trump I: federal funding held steady in the early days before surging in response to Covid. Trump II, however, seems far more determined to revoke funding from adversarial local governments. Its defining piece of legislation to date, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, partly offset $4.5 trillion in cumulative federal revenues over ten years with $1.2 trillion in spending cuts over the same period. These are concentrated in Medicaid and food stamps, which will fall hard on state budgets. New York State faces annual costs of $15 billion once the bill’s provisions take full effect. By and large, such costs do not filter down to the local level: New York City stands to absorb just $100 million in cuts to food stamp funding. Nevertheless, a state government facing massive shortfalls may be less forthcoming with aid to local governments. 

    The annual federal budget poses a greater risk to the City. For the current federal fiscal year, the White House initially proposed cutting aid to local education, housing vouchers, and other block grants that collectively amount to about $1.8 billion annually. These cuts were not included in the continuing resolution that ended the recent shutdown, which holds federal funding at constant levels. But as the Trump administration’s signature legislation made clear, these areas of federal spending remain at risk in future federal budget negotiations. White House discretion over disaster relief funding is a further risk: the federal funding that has followed past disasters and recessions is far from assured for the next three years.

    Mamdani will have to fight to maintain his expansionary program in this context of federal and state retrenchment. His free buses pledge is expected to cost roughly $700 million per year, while the construction of two hundred thousand housing units through borrowing could raise annual debt service costs by $3 billion. His single most expensive pledge, universal childcare, may cost as much as $6 billion. Yet even if the City budget faces headwinds from Washington, its vast and resilient economic base gives Mamdani the ability to weather them. Here, tax reform is of paramount importance. If the City’s revenue had kept pace with its economy over the last fifteen years, it would be able to fund universal childcare four times over. Bringing these two metrics into closer alignment is thus a clear priority. Property taxes can be raised by the City itself, while other revenue will require State legislation. Policymakers at both levels must not let misbudgeting create the false impression that New York City’s fiscal challenges are insurmountable. The economic resources exist to respond to looming threats and to deliver the services demanded by the electorate. It is not a problem of accounting, but of political will. 

  5. New Dilemmas

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    For nearly two decades, the price of Brazilian agricultural goods has been on the rise—not only burdening household budgets, but also generating inflationary pressures and contributing to economic instability.1For all intents and purposes, we will use the terms “agricultural product prices” and “food prices” interchangeably here, although we recognize that not all agricultural production is intended for food, and a significant portion of commodities do not go directly to the consumer’s table. Over this period, the rising cost of food has become a site of controversy that has fueled dissatisfaction with the cost of living and distrust in public institutions. Yet its causes, which are tied to global commodity trends rather than local demand, are neglected in public discourse. As a major exporter of agricultural goods, Brazil’s domestic food markets are fundamentally linked to international ones. Fluctuations in the latter—whether driven by supply shocks, changes in demand patterns, climate change, or inter-state conflict—therefore reverberate throughout the Brazilian economy, affecting the entire production chain, from basic crops to processed foods. 

    Three factors have aggravated food price volatility since the 2010s. The first is currency depreciation. Brazil’s exchange rate is a critical variable that mediates the interaction between national and international prices. When it depreciates, this amplifies the effect of rising global food prices by increasing the cost of importing necessary inputs and goods. Second, price shocks have grown more profound as an increasing share of Brazil’s arable land has been channeled away from crops for domestic consumption and towards commodities sensitive to global market fluctuations. And finally, repeated financial crises at global level have driven speculative behavior in commodity markets and disrupted trade flows, triggering dramatic and unpredictable price swings.

    Food price inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, crop substitutions, and global financial crises: these factors are tied together in a complex web of relations. Understanding them is essential not only for mitigating food price issues in the short run, but for building a more resilient food system in the years to come. 

    Brazilian Agriculture in a Global Market

    In Brazil, the price of food has been a recurrent cause of social unrest and political conflict. Vulnerable populations often suffer from hunger and live in a state of more or less permanent anxiety about where to find their next meal—with mass protests an inevitable result. Figure 1 depicts Brazilians’ interest in the topic of food inflation since 2004, demonstrating both its persistent prominence and the increased attention it receives in times of crisis, such as 2008 and 2020. 

    A closer look at agricultural price trends helps explain why national interest in the issue has been increasing since the late 2000s. Figure 2 shows that, since 2008, the food price index (“IPCA de alimentos”) has grown at a faster rate than the total Extended Consumer Price Index (IPCA). This means that food price inflation is outpacing average price increases for other goods and services: housing, transportation, education, health, clothing, social care. Moreover, since food accounts for 21.7% of the overall index, it constitutes one of the core reasons for the rise in the IPCA.

    Why are food prices rising so rapidly in a country that prides itself on being the “breadbasket of the world”? The rapid pace and variable nature of producing unprocessed food prices, compared to industrialized ones, suggests that agricultural conditions are in large part responsible. Rising land, input, and capital prices directly contribute to higher production costs which translate to higher prices. This trend is exacerbated by demographic growth and increased purchasing power, as growing demand for food comes up against rigid agricultural supply. The problem is also deepened by the impact of climate change, with severe droughts and excessive rainfall hampering productivity and making supply more unpredictable.

    Still, such domestic factors are not enough in themselves to explain Brazil’s increased agricultural prices. It is also relevant that since the mid-2000s, global price indices for major agricultural commodities have been steadily on the rise. Prevailing analyses suggest that population growth, rising global incomes, and the embrace of biofuels have increased rates of global demand, while higher production costs, climate change, and reduced investment in agricultural R&D have served to constrain supply. 

    At the same time, the rapid economic development of countries such as China and India over the last two decades has had a significant effect on food prices. In keeping with Merrill Bennett’s 1941 findings, rising incomes set in motion a shift away from grains and starches and towards more diversified diets with higher protein and nutrient intakes. These changing consumption patterns place additional pressure on food prices, reinforcing the upward trend.

    Figure 4 shows that these global headwinds have a direct impact on agricultural prices in Brazil. The price index of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) follows a trajectory closely resembling that of the IPCA: a similarity that stems from the deep integration of Brazilian food markets into global markets. Economic and financial crises, geopolitical tension, extreme weather, pandemics, and technological advances—both in agriculture and the logistics of global value chains—thus have acute effects on the Brazilian population. Recent salient examples are the 2008 crash, the droughts in Australia in 2008 and 2019 and in Russia in 2010, the floods in the United States in 2008 and 2019, Covid-19 and its disruption of supply chains, and the conflict in Ukraine since 2022: all of which were registered in Brazilian supermarkets and grocery stores. 

    Export-driven growth 

    Brazil has held a consistent trade surplus in agriculture for the past four decades. As a result, increases in global commodity prices encourage local producers to dedicate more and more land to planting. Soybean and corn, two key products for animal feed, illustrate the cyclical relationship between prices, export supply, and production structure. As we can see from Figures 5 and 6, both the land area dedicated to these crops and the volume of production have grown significantly over the last twenty years.

    Between 2000 and 2020, the production of soybeans increased by 253.63% and the area dedicated to planting them by 175.8%. The expansion took place not only in the Central-West and South regions, where seedoil production is concentrated, but across other macro-regions of the country. In the northeastern Cerrado, productivity per hectare has already reached the levels of the two highest producing regions, thanks to growing mechanization, while in the Southeast soybeans have effectively competed for land with the historically powerful sugarcane sector.

    Stimulated by grain and meat exports, corn production has meanwhile grown by 145% and the planted area by 61.2% between 2001 and 2020. The Midwest region was the main driver of this expansion, enabled by a large-scale, mechanized production model which is integrated into global grain and meat commodity chains. And yet, as the production of these animal feed products has skyrocketed, that of stable foods like rice and beans has stagnated. The land on which to cultivate them has contracted, as planting was discouraged by declining bean consumption and the difficulty of integrating rice into global commodity chains. 

    Overall supply has not declined as a result of these changing incentives, since greater mechanization of production has led to substantial productivity gains. In the case of rice, for instance, greater concentration of production in the south of the country became a key factor in maintaining supply. Yet this spatial concentration of production also carries risks. If weather conditions in Rio Grande do Sul deteriorate, as they did during the floods of 2024, rice production can sharply decline and its price can be pushed up. The amount of land devoted to planting beans similarly plummeted between 2001 and 2020, with production tending downwards and productivity gains unable to offset the sharp reduction of the planted area. 

    The comparison between soybeans and corn on the one hand, and rice and beans on the other, thus illustrates the immense power of foreign markets on Brazil’s agricultural sector. The structure of these markets has major implications for the availability of stable foods and the price at which they are sold domestically. 

    Financialized production

    Beyond foreign exchange markets, Brazil’s dependence on international commodities markets increases the power of global finance. Regardless of production, the value of both commodities and land appreciates purely through their ability to attract investment. Investment funds around the globe have begun to focus on natural resources and the agrifood sector. In 2005, only 43 funds were operating in this area; by 2023 the number had soared to 960. The price of agricultural commodities, especially on large specialized exchanges abroad, therefore represents a speculative bet on its future appreciation and ability to turn a profit. 

    In times of major financial crises these problems intensify, as the gap between financial and productive value widens. To combat price rises in such circumstances, it is not enough to simply control “conventional” variables (such as supply and marketing structures, demand profiles, and so on); it is also necessary to identify the financial “triggers” that drive up costs, and develop measures to mitigate their impact. This means confronting the interests of investors and other financial market agents; but this, of course, is a significant political hurdle. 

    In Brazil, this financialized framework for agriculture received a major boost in 2004, with the launch of so-called “agribusiness securities,” notably Agribusiness Receivables Certificates (CRA) and Agribusiness Letters of Credit (LCA), which became part of the structure of financial investment operations in the sector. The financial interests who have stood to benefit include a growing mass of small investors, attracted by tax exemptions and effective marketing campaigns. The LCA has also played an important role in the funding of the National Rural Credit System (SNCR) over the last 10 years, especially since 2021, when its share jumped from between 15% and 20% of total resources offered to over 40% (with this percentage reaching an astonishing 70% for medium and large producers). 

    The growth of this financialized security, created with the explicit aim of bringing in more resources to finance agricultural production, is clearly based on expectations of gains in the value of such securities traded in specific circuits. This, in turn, may influence the formation of agricultural prices in the production chains where they operate. It may also, given the instability of the supply of credit associated with these securities, have the effect of weakening the resource base that structures rural credit policy, which is essential to guarantee supply in a given agricultural harvest.

    In Brazil, then, agricultural food prices go far beyond questions of domestic supply and demand. The structural attachment to global markets calls for complex and innovative solutions that address the country’s exchange rate, guide decisions around crop planting and production, and regulate the degree of financialization, including the resumption of a more robust regulatory stock formation policy. Any serious attempt to address this longstanding dilemma will not succeed unless it grapples with these international factors. 

    This is an edited version of an article first published in Revista Rosa

  6. Mexico’s Big Green State

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    At Claudia Sheinbaum’s first State of Affairs speech, the President announced the passage of fourteen new energy sector laws after only eleven months in office. Sheinbaum’s series of reforms mark a new era for state-coordination in the energy sector, a vision that has triggered a wave of criticisms from the business community and beyond. 

    Take, for example, the opinion of Mexican leading climate expert Dr. Adrián Fernandez, who, at the time of Sheinbaum’s election, told the Washington Post that Sheinbaum’s climate views “are incompatible with her promises to continue many of López Obrador’s energy policies […] like strengthening the national oil and electricity companies.” The comment suggests that ambitious decarbonization efforts are incompatible with an energy sector characterized by dominant state-owned enterprises. It is the latter with which many business leaders are primarily concerned.

    Critics of the active state in Mexico allege that market intervention generates underinvestment. Furthermore, they claim that Mexican state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not adequate to competently navigate new waves of technology. And, in the wider North American context, SOEs are thought to put Mexico’s industry in jeopardy by triggering mechanisms of investment protection. 

    The suspicion of SOEs—whether in general, or specific to the green transition—is unfounded. Most private investment in renewable energy across the globe has been facilitated by long-term supply contracts from SOEs or central government agencies. Out of all solar and wind energy projects, two-thirds are held by Chinese SOEs (incidentally, China has recently confirmed an impressive target of 3,500 Gigawatts of solar and wind by 2035). And new forms of intervention in the energy sector are welcome by investors searching for low-risk investments with long-term return profiles.

    Moreover, utility SOEs have played a crucial role in technological renovation worldwide. In Mexico, the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) transformed the natural gas supply system in 2015, following two decades of failure by the private sector in a liberalized gas market. Regionally, the existing regulatory environment will necessarily need to adapt as new technologies join the portfolio of solutions in energy generation, storage, and demand management. While risks are high under a shifting regime, the US’s gradual turn towards a negotiated approach to technological change may minimize the impacts.

    Far from representing an obstacle to Sheinbaum’s climate objectives, it is precisely through SOEs that the President is pursuing her vision for the green transition. Her administration has reinforced AMLO’s program to revive Mexico’s SOEs—Pemex and CFE—with new decarbonization and industrial policy ambitions.

    On some policy issues, the difference is one of means rather than ends. For example, in order to increase the share of low-carbon electricity by 10 to 20 percent—a commonly agreed policy aim—Sheinbaum’s government has tasked SOEs with orchestrating investment, and turned to state regulatory capabilities to ensure private sector investment. In other cases, the ends themselves have become more ambitious: in the absence of private investment in the EV market, the government has initiated a new business venture, Olinia, to manufacture small urban EVs and launched a lithium battery industry.

    Under Sheinbaum’s leadership, CFE has committed to investing in concentrated solar power, PEMEX has announced entry into lithium extraction in oil brines, and a revamped railway agency has commandeered unused infrastructure and land rights to create a state-owned nationwide network of passenger trains. These policies have been pursued with a redistributive orientation. Sheinbaum’s government has pledged to achieve universal electricity access largely with solar PV, as well as to provide free solar panels to low-income populations vulnerable to heat stress at no cost, with federal funding but through the implementing capacity of CFE. 

    From a governance perspective, the most striking change has been the creation of an Energy Planning Council tasked with coordinating investment and steering the development of technology to resolve endemic problems of energy access and poverty. As I’ve argued with electricity sector expert Naxcitli Calva, Sheinbaum’s government has made planning a pillar of governance as important as regulation—which was traditionally the only form of governance in the electricity sector 1 Under the previous governance model, the Ministry had a consultative council on clean energy which, at its height, contributed to reviewing renewable energy goals and proposed specific incentives policies for renewable energy, serving to legitimize policy making through NGO and academic participation. These types of stakeholders had formal positions in the council, and could see their specific proposition being included in policy documents stating lists of actions intended during the administration, called sectoral or special programs. For participants having to provide proof of impact to donors, these documents could become critical evidence of influence. .

    Sheinbaum’s proposed SOEs reforms are part and parcel of a “Big Green State,” one that redefines the role of traditional energy SOEs and establishes their importance in manufacturing to pull the private sector into strategic business ventures. If successful, Sheinbaum’s bet will ensure that strategic assets of decarbonization are owned and operated by the government.

    The formation of this Green State is important not just because Mexico stands as the largest fossil fuel consumer south of the United States. It’s also important because it presents an opportunity to explore innovative approaches to mobilizing state capacity for decarbonization and expanding the notion of what is feasible in the international policy landscape.

    Liberalization without Decarbonization

    Mexico’s post-war energy sector was built on the pillars of state ownership. This gradual process began with the nationalization of the oil industry in 1937 and culminated with the nationalization of the electricity industry in 1960. Generation capacity grew primarily through investments by the state-owned company, Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), in hydro, fossil fuel, and geothermal power plants. It wasn’t until the late 1980s that CFE developed its first (and only) nuclear energy project that opened in 1994.

    A turning point would come in the 1990s, when the government of Carlos Salinas oversaw legislative approval of reforms that enabled private ownership in energy generation to more closely align with a US growth model. The financial crises of 1994 and 1997, coupled with the electoral victory of a right-wing President Vicente Fox in 2000 after over seventy years of dominant party rule, accelerated this liberalization process 2 However, these governments lacked the political support needed to amend the Constitution until 2013 . 

    Between 2013 and 2015, a center-right legislative coalition (which in 2024 would become the anti-Morena electoral coalition) approved constitutional reforms and a long list of legal changes to open energy markets. The energy model promised to double the size of oil and gas extraction by private companies and refocus the electricity utility towards the energy transport business, diminishing its role in power generation. 

    But before the ink could dry, the utility was already signing contracts to derisk the most significant historic expansion of natural gas transportation from the United States—making the company one of the largest purchasers of US natural gas. One after the other, new segments of energy markets developed under a state-derisking model, first gas contracts and then long-term electricity contracts. As illustrated in Table 1, the Mexican Right and Liberal approach to derisking through utilizing state-owned enterprises should not be confused with a structural reform approach, as it relied on SOEs to balance conflicting political goals. But it nevertheless represented a liberal derisking model focused on public-private partnerships and a thin regulatory state. 

    Source: Valenzuela, J.M. 2023. “State ownership in liberal economic governance?” World Development Perspectives.

    Liberalization did not lead to decarbonization. In fact, the liberalization trajectory coincided with the global shift towards natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power generation technologies. And since the US had emerged as a leading producer of natural gas from shale deposits by the 2010s, between 1999 and 2016, Mexico’s SOE contracted more than 15 GW of NGCC capacity. Private entities developed a similar amount of capacity through self-supply and bilateral contracts. This was followed by more than 11 GW under long-term contracts, mostly for wind and solar power. Yet, the reliability of the system still depended on the portfolio of generation and electricity grid owned by the state.

    Betting on state prevalence

    This is the model that the AMLO government sought to contest. Instead, it argued for the need for SOEs that could invest, own, and operate their power plants and use the public company balance sheet to protect the final consumers from the instability of global and regional energy markets. 

    Sheinbaum’s reforms intend to implement this vision through an orchestrated transformation of the governance paradigm, focusing on coordination as well as the creation of a strong (but not independent) regulatory apparatus benefiting from the new planning system. 

    In 2024, over 60 percent of the country’s electricity generation came from NGCC, with clean energy under 20 percent 3 This was in the midst of a historical drought that cut hydropower a couple of percentage points from total power generation , as described in Table 2. But Sheinbaum’s announced plans would put clean power generation at 38 percent by 2030 with both state and private sector participation.

    Table 2: Power generation (2024)

    TechnologyGWhTWh%Category
    NGCC212,81928681%Thermal
    Thermal (other)44,092
    Coal12,968
    Nuclear11,978
    CHP3,912
    Hydro23,8006719%Clean
    Wind19,987
    Solar PV18,640
    Geothermal3,576
    Bioenergy533
    Source: Author based on SENER. 2025. “Plan de Desarrollo del Sector Eléctrico. 2025.

    These decisions bear important implications both for domestic consumers and for the international business community. While electricity consumption in the UK has diminished by one fourth since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-9 (309TWh in 2023), Mexico’s has grown by one third in the same period and could easily double or triple by mid-century (358 TWh in 2023). Mexico is one of the largest growing energy markets outside the US and China.

    Where is additional demand going to come from? Prior to AMLO’s government, the lack of direct investment in generation by CFE left a growing share available for private sector supply. Sheinbaum’s legislative reforms have affirmed the political commitment to maintaining 54 percent of power generation in state hands through direct investment from the SOEs, state control over special purpose vehicles with power generation assets, and new forms of co-investment. To avoid the consolidation of debt onto government books, the latter must maintain more than 50 percent ownership by the state but less than 75 percent.

    Under AMLO, the government negotiated the purchase of the Spanish conglomerate Iberdrola’s IPPs power plants as a way to resolve a legal and regulatory conflict with the company. The result was a significant increase in assets and generation owned by the state, even if not directly by the state-owned CFE, but through and special purpose vehicle hosted by FONADIN, the National Infrastructure Fund. That particular choice initiated what might turn out to be a wave of innovations in financial engineering within the government and CFE.  

    According to the latest electricity sector plans, the first under President Sheinbaum’s new legislative package, in 2026 state-controlled assets will generate 54 percent of power, which might grow to 59 percent by 2030, from 41 percent in 2022, as presented in Table 3.

    Table 3: Evolution of power generation from state-controlled assets

    CategoryControl202220262030
    StateCFE41%42.6%47.5%
    FONADIN (former Iberdrola IPPs)10.7%7.0%
    PEMEX0.6%4.6%
    % State control54%59%
    PrivatesPrivate IPPs58%16.3%10.1%
    Privates29.7%30.9%
    % Private control46%41%
    Central Planning scenario (TWh)State control139.7201.6243.3
    Private control197.6171.7169.1
    Gross Generation340.7373.3412.4
    Sources: Author based on SENER. 2025. “Plan de Desarrollo del Sector Eléctrico 2025″; Valenzuela and García. 2024. “Leveraging Transparency in the Management of Public-private Contract in Mexico’s Electricity Sector.” Energy for Growth Hub

    This degree of state intervention might risk triggering a capital strike. The announcement of Iberdrola’s decision to sell all remaining assets in Mexico earlier in the summer of 2025 led several experts to conclude, precisely, that such a capital strike was taking place. Ultimately, another Spanish company, Cox, purchased the remaining fifteen power plants and the pipeline of projects for 4.2 billion, signaling there is a much more diversified ecosystem of investors with the appetite to try out Mexico’s new set of rules.

    Furthermore, contrary to the prevailing accounts, Mexico is not wholly dependent on FDI for access to capital and technology, nor are foreign investors unwilling to accept long-term strategic partnerships with states that control key assets. Mexico’s domestic financial environment has changed dramatically since the 1990s: its pension funds have grown to constitute  19.1 percent of GDP in 2024, development banks now contribute 5 percent of GDP in assets (and financed the purchase of Iberdrola assets), and SOEs have encouraged the private sector to embrace financial innovations by funding infrastructure like transmission without affecting the central government balance sheet. Thus, the political economy configuration is open, and the government is in a position to choose which form of private investment will be best suited to participate in the decarbonization of the industry.

    CFE will be able to leverage its recent experience in building a 1GW solar PV project in the northern state of Sonora. Having completed its first, the company could replicate these large-scale projects as well as break them down into hundreds of mid-size plants across the country. During the last week of August, CFE announced two projects for concentrated solar power in the region of Baja California Sur, an an electric island disconnected from the country’s grid. Though the plant’s construction has been complicated by weak US technology,  it nevertheless underscores the government’s appetite for new technological ventures from the SOE.

    For the private sector, the newly announced regulations have opened new areas for exploration in the modernization of the electricity system—from distributed generation to storage and controllable demand. In addition to its 44 percent market share, these new areas underscore the expectation that the private sector’s role is to push the boundaries of market innovations.

    What’s in a promise?

    Where critics see danger, we should see an open horizon of new opportunities for green investment. The capacity of the state to reconfigure its economic role requires carefully threading creative experiments to push the boundaries of what key actors (credit agencies, investment dispute arbiters, and others) deem reasonable before a backlash from national and international investors materializes.  

    Two critical tensions emerge from the promise of the Green State. The first and more obvious is opposition by corporate interests whose business depends on the long-term ownership and operation of critical assets in energy and infrastructure: global utility companies and asset management firms. The second is the long-term commitment from SOEs to existing fossil fuel value chains. At the moment, CFE’s overcommitment to natural gas trade represents a short-term barrier to the expansion of renewable energy, unless industrial growth and electrification of the economy create enough demand to make room for CFE’s gas commitments and renewable energy. 

    But Sheinbaum’s model opens a new constellation of possible strategic alliances. It introduces opportunities to generate competition from technology, construction, and development companies, and it positions PEMEX to manage the scaling down of fossil fuel reliance in the long run. The basis of opposition to this platform, then, is not reflective of the threats it poses to decarbonization. It is instead reflective of the country’s recent history of liberalization, a history which must be challenged and overcome.

    Citizens and investors are witnessing (and requesting) a more active role for the state in coordinating and sustaining investment in decarbonization. What is different in Sheinbaum’s platform is not only the scale of expected engagement from SOEs, but the fearless commitment to the underlying principles a Green State requires: trust in the centrality of politics over technocracy and state coordination over markets. Importantly, it demonstrates confidence in the possibility that a developing country can, with the right tools, reach the pinnacle of the technological frontier.

  7. Stabilization and Speculation

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    New York’s housing crisis—characterized by sky-high rents, extraordinary waitlists for affordable housing, and low-quality housing stock—is undeniable, and solving it calls for new policy interventions. Tenant organizations generally argue that the solution is stronger rent regulations, increased enforcement of housing maintenance codes, the right to organize, and, increasingly, public-sector ownership. Real-estate associations, on the other hand, assert that such laws are in fact the very cause of the crisis, and that the remedy is deregulation to allow for higher profit margins, which will in turn incentivize the building of more housing. The more we unleash the private market, they claim, the more rents will eventually come down.

    This entrenched conflict reflects a broader national trend. For at least the last fifty years, private real-estate speculation has driven urban politics in the United States.1Mayors confronting federal austerity amid the inflationary business cycles of the 1970s signaled this shift. Recognition among social scientists can be dated to Harvey Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” (<)em(>)The American Journal of Sociology(<)/em(>), September 1976, though, as William Domhoff and others have argued, the presence of real-estate developers in many Democratic Party growth machines dates at least to the New Deal, when the political coalition included a much more powerful labor movement. For a study of the growth coalition in Atlanta, see Clarence Stone, (<)em(>)Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988 (<)/em(>)(University of Kansas: 1989). For a history of New York City arguing for a regime change during the 1970s, see Kim Phillips-Fein, (<)em(>)Fear City: New York’s Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics(<)/em(>) (Metropolitan: 2017). In countless American statehouses and local governments, the notion that our cities will thrive when property values are on the rise is rarely challenged. Rising land value (and therefore, rising rents) is the overriding goal, and the broader question of providing housing that people can afford is, by and large, secondary. In New York City, as elsewhere, lawmakers struggling to solve the housing problem will fail to do so if they are unable to face the underlying problem of speculation at its root. 

    New York City’s housing politics are defined by acute competition between these organized forces: a robust tenant movement that has secured the strongest rent stabilization laws and public-housing tools in the United States, as well as the country’s most powerful real estate lobby, accustomed to shaping our city in its image. It’s no surprise that the New York City mayoral race has brought this antagonism to the fore. Apartment owners and real-estate developers are the largest group of donors to mayoral candidate Andrew Cuomo’s largest super PACs—Fix the City, Inc. ($32.6 million), Put NYC First, Inc. ($3 million), and Housing for ALL ($2.5 million)—while tenants propelled Zohran Mamdani to victory in the Democratic primary. The election has revealed both the enduring influence of the idea that public policy must prioritize ever-rising property values for private owners—and the outlines of a path beyond it. 

    Regulation and deregulation in New York City

    Rent regulation is best understood not as an affordable housing program but as consumer protection. In tight real-estate markets where a housing shortage produces rapidly rising rents, it is in the public interest to regulate them. New York City has regulated rents in one form or another since 1920, when soldiers returning from World War I flooded the market and demand for housing spiked. Moves to regulate the cost of rental housing have often come in response to rapidly rising rents, during periods in which working-class incomes and prices were generally on the up. When workers have more to spend, landlords can charge more.

    New York’s current form of rent stabilization has its origins in the early 1970s, when inflation forced the cost of living to the top of the political agenda. During the 1969 mayoral election, incumbent John Lindsay responded to organized tenant pressure by passing the Rent Stabilization Law, bringing 400,000 housing units under “stabilization”—annual rent increases permitted within limits set by a Rent Guidelines Board. Enforcing these limits fell to a private, but licensed, Rent Stabilization Association (RSA), with powers delegated by the Board which monitored this “self-regulation.”

    Yet self-regulation of rents by apartment owners quickly became problematic, particularly after 1971, when organized apartment owners successfully lobbied Albany to enact “vacancy decontrol”—meaning that upon vacancy, a landlord could raise the rent on units to the going market rate. In a context of rising vacancies, the opportunity to raise rents on empty apartments introduced an incentive to create more empty apartments, displacing families in pursuit of higher monthly profits. The ensuing evictions, rent increases, and landlord-tenant conflicts compelled  the state legislature to seek new solutions. The resulting Emergency Tenant Protection Act (EPTA) of 1974 created the system we know today. 

    Each year, landlords and tenants come together to duke it out before a locally-appointed Rent Guidelines Board. The Boards then adjust the maximum permitted rent increases for regulated apartments, with state lawmakers in Albany deciding which properties are subject to regulation. In a temporary commission convened by Governor Nelson Rockefeller to draft the EPTA, policy makers took aim at vacancy control and profit-motivated real-estate speculation, noting its incompatibility with high-quality housing. “In New York City,” they wrote, the excess rent for above-stabilization rent increases under vacancy decontrol “was not reinvested in capital improvements, but in fact resulted in an actual decrease of 30 percent in renovations.” Landlords were not reinvesting; they were pocketing the extra money. 

    By 1982, the State of New York had fully ended self-regulation of rent stabilization. The Rent Stabilization Association reinvented itself as an advocacy organization to represent the industry, and was joined by another such lobby group: the Community Housing Improvement Program (CHIP). 

    An interest group and business model

    The next twist in the story came in 1994, when the RSA began to push through reforms that gave rise to a new business model for the rent stabilized market, which would endure for more than two decades. The group won new amendments to the city’s rent stabilization system that gradually caused it to disappear through attrition: once a unit costing $2,000 a month or more was vacant, it would now be released from stabilization altogether.2 To accomplish this, the RSA hired the chief of staff to City Council Speaker Peter Vallone. These laws also provided landlords with an instrument to raise rents between vacancies: individual apartment improvements (IAIs), submitted by the landlord but without meaningful oversight of the claimed costs of the investments. Three years later, Albany took the further step of awarding 20 percent “rent bonuses” to landlords whenever a stabilized unit fell vacant, regardless of improvements. As a result, between 1994 and 2019, NYC lost nearly 250,000 rent stabilized apartments—about a quarter of the stock.

    While rent stabilization cut into real-estate profits by limiting the amount of income owners could get from tenants, decontrol created an entirely new business model. Whereas a traditional response to rent regulation was for landlords to “milk” buildings, maximizing owner income by cutting costs rather than raising rents, under the new decontrol laws owners sought to use capital improvements, individual rehab submissions, and vacancy bonuses to raise stabilized rents above the decontrol threshold—and into the higher margins of market rents. Much like in the early 1970s, this model relied on eviction, displacement, and harassment. Faced with laws intended to protect working New Yorkers from the rising cost of living, landlords of regulated units mobilized to replace existing tenants with richer ones.

    Multi-family real-estate financing adapted to this market. Increasingly, banks financed multi-family housing acquisition based on the assumption that rent-stabilized units could be converted into market-rate ones. From 2008 to 2016, for example, a group of twenty-nine New York City landlords engaged two property management companies, Newcastle and Highcastle, to submit individual-apartment-improvement rent-increases where labor costs always exactly met the threshold required to bring the units out of stabilization. Meanwhile, Signature Bank issued many loans during the 2010s on terms that assumed people buying apartment buildings would raise rents far beyond stabilization ceilings. Banks that specialized in lending against multifamily properties, such as New York Community Bancorp (the second largest multifamily lender in the country), extended credit liberally on this basis, as did larger ones such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase. 

    Consider the case of Emerald Equities, a corporate apartment landlord in New York. In 2016, the company purchased eleven rent-stabilized apartment buildings in East Harlem for $357 million, using funds raised from private lender LoneCore Capital. Over the next year, it successfully converted 251 of the total 1,181 units to market rate by allegedly harassing tenants into moving out. Brookhill Properties, which in 2015 had purchased sixteen apartment buildings in the East Village, likewise undertook what the State Attorney General described as “illegal and fraudulent acts to harass tenants and vacate units as quickly as possible”—including falsely informing tenants that their units had been removed from rent stabilization and carrying out “unsafe construction…intended to drive away the remaining rent-regulated tenants.” In 2016, two Brooklyn landlords were convicted of hiring “vandals” to intimidate tenants with sledgehammers, bats, and pitbulls at five of their Bushwick apartment buildings. 

    Such activities elicited organized opposition. Tenant groups fought to close the many loopholes that had been created over the last twenty-five years. This period of sustained pressure on lawmakers resulted in the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSTPA), which passed in 2019, rendering unlawful many planned rent increases by landlords such as Emerald, Brookhill, and others. Emerald company pushed ahead with the increases regardless and was later criminally charged by the state Attorney General. Unable to make good on its debts, it declared bankruptcy in 2024. 

    Blood from a stone

    The HSTPA reforms, along with the pandemic-induced slow-down in working-class incomes, the Federal Reserve’s high interest rates, rapidly rising costs of real estate insurance, and general volatility in the real-estate market caused by Trump, have since interrupted this speculative business model—spurring a series of foreclosures and bankruptcies. The crux of the problem, however, is the fever-dream of real estate speculation that fueled the rent-stabilized market from 1994 to 2019. As one New York landlord and financial consultant told Bloomberg last year, “Everyone in this world of rent stabilized buildings is sort of engaged in this collective delusion. They’re waiting for the Supreme Court to overturn rent control. They’re waiting for the legislature to weaken the HSTPA.” But the financial gamble on deregulation is also running into a simple market reality: people who live and work in New York City can only pay so much more in rent. “Even if the laws did allow for higher rent increases than they do now,” the landlord continued, “at some point you can’t pull blood from a stone.”

    Recently the bad bets have started to come due. Signature Bank declared bankruptcy in 2024. The government superintended a merger with New York Community Bancorp, which itself declared bankruptcy a few months later—ultimately rebranding the reorganized entity as Flagstar Bank. If industry’s business model had depended on bringing units out from stabilization into the high-income, market-rate market, stronger rent-control laws have now made this impossible.

    Rent stabilization covers nearly half of the apartments in New York City, and the industry claims that HSTPA has made it financially infeasible to maintain these buildings. They argue that without deregulation, the City of New York will fall back into what they describe as the disinvested hellscape of the 1980s. It is true that there is a small but acute crisis within the rent-stabilized housing stock: 2–3 percent, or about twenty to thirty thousand rent-stabilized units, meet the statutory definition of physical distress. The buildings are hundreds of years old, and in certain cases the rental income cannot cover operating and maintenance costs. But the history of decontrol shows that allowing landlords to raise rents in New York has rarely improved conditions at the bottom of the market. “IAIs are not being used to encourage basic investment and maintenance,” concludes a joint study by Association for Neighborhood & Housing Development and the Housing Rights Initiative, “but to enact extreme rent increases between tenancies.”In other words, New York City’s housing market remains unaffordable for renters, and the cost of building and maintaining housing is higher than ever before for owners—but the financial struggles of the former are fundamentally different to those of the latter, and most proposed solutions to the second problem tend to intensify the first. 

    Beyond the impasse 

    In the June Democratic mayoral primary, hundreds of thousands of tenants who cannot afford their monthly housing costs voted for Zohran Mamdani, whose flagship policy was to freeze rents on all stabilized housing. Now, with Mamdani on the cusp of winning the mayoralty, the details of his plan are coming under intense scrutiny, with the landlord lobby arguing that it will exacerbate the poor condition of the housing stock. 

    It is true that a rent freeze, without additional intervention, risks deepening the crises within the market. Owners of rent-stabilized buildings may choose not to invest in their properties. If conflict between the city and the large real estate firms intensifies, and building conditions continue to deteriorate, the question of new construction could be politically pinned on the rent freeze. What would effectively be a capital strike could then be construed as the effect of this progressive housing reform. 

    What impact will the rent freeze have, then, on the current impasse? Already, the centrality of the demand to city politics has opened up a new chapter in the struggle for a sane housing policy. A long-due conversation about housing conditions can make possible new housing politics—if paired with an effective code enforcement program and public investment in housing affordability, the proposed freeze will place the Mayor’s office squarely on the side of habitability, in defense of the quality of life for hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers.

    But investment in enforcement is not in itself enough. With its multi-billion-dollar capital budget, the City has the capacity to act as a non-speculative market actor: purchasing buildings where the landlord is no longer interested in ownership. Thanks to its scale, its lack of a profit motive, and its taxing power, the City can intervene to stabilize volatile markets and act as a counter-cyclical force that puts housing quality first and property values second. It can use this power—to acquire rent stabilized housing as a market actor—to drive down costs for operators and improve housing quality across New York. 

    As a long-term owner, meanwhile, the City can act as something like a quasi-community land trust: holding land in a city-wide portfolio and leasing out the right to collect rents, while using its position as landowner to pursue asset management at scale. As its portfolio grows, it could use rents from higher-income buildings to fund operations and lower-income buildings in other parts of New York. This type of portfolio-wide asset-management approach would help New York avoid some of the challenges of private-sector-led affordable housing deals of the past, where individual operators sought building-by-building deals with the City and many projects ended up facing cash-flow issues.

    To ensure quality housing for renters in a market where the tools of real estate speculation are suppressed, we need to combine the power to enforce housing standards and the power to finance and acquire rental housing—two capacities the City already has.

    Tenants in the growth machine

    The example of the Mamdani campaign—in which tenants’ demands can carry a mayoralty—is rare in American cities. An entire academic literature has sprung up to examine the “local growth machines” that determine urban politics in favor of elites, particularly those who can claim rents on real estate.3This financial power has long been on display in America’s largest cities, whether in the National Association of Realtors’ campaign to defeat Chicago mayor Brandon Johnson’s “mansion tax,” the California Business Roundtable’s attempts to repeal local tax initiatives to fund affordable housing, or Andrew Cuomo’s speech to the Real Estate Board of New York during the New York Democratic Primary. It is reflected in the rhetoric that predominates in local news and politics: the corollary to the “job-creator” epithet is the “housing provider”—the landowner who has made an (<)em(>)investment (<)/em(>)in the neighborhood, and whose business renting homes to residents makes them valuable to the political representative. Tenants—comparatively more transient, owning no property—must then have less of a “stake” in their communities and neighborhoods. Tenants make up the majority of the population in every major city in the US but tend to vote at lower rates than homeowners. They also tend to be less organized, less rich, and therefore less politically connected than real-estate developers. In this sense, the Mamdani victory in June represents a genuine disruption, whose ultimate implications are yet to be seen. 

    This is the backdrop to Cuomo’s flagging campaign. Before incumbent Mayor Eric Adams had dropped out of the race, Jeff and Lisa Blau—the developers of Manhattan’s twenty-eight-acre, six-building Hudson Yards skyscraper complex—along with Aby Rosen of RFR Holding and Laurie Tisch—billionaire aunt of NYPD commissioner Jessica Tisch—organized an emergency meeting of real estate moguls, who came together to devise a strategy “to ensure that the next mayor of New York is Andrew Cuomo.” The Fix the City super PAC—which as of late October had spent $17.5 million supporting Cuomo and another $8.8 million opposing Zohran Mamdani—now has a diversified war chest with money from Michael Bloomberg, DoorDash, and hedge funds, yet it began as a project of those whose solvency depends on paying back debt issued to them on the assumption of ever escalating rents. These are the executives of such corporate landlords as A&E Real Estate Management (one New York City’s worst landlords), RXR Realty (investor in the JFK airport redevelopment), RFR Holding (owner of the Times Square Paramount Hotel and the Seagram Building), and Two Trees Management Co., whose CEO Jed Walentas also chairs the Real Estate Board of New York. The other major super PAC backing Cuomo, Housing for All, is funded entirely by $2.5 million from the New York Apartment Association—the super lobby formed by the merger in 2024 of CHIP and RSA to move the city’s Rent Guidelines Board every year for higher rents on city’s rent-stabilized apartments.

    And yet, despite this astonishing level of landlord organization, Mamdani is nonetheless poised to win on November 4. Whether he will be able to break the cycle of stabilization, disinvestment, and speculation depends on what happens next. If a new era of housing policy is to begin in New York City, the next Mayoral administration must seize the moment to reset a broken market—not just freezing the rent, but making active policy interventions across the sector—and tenants must organize to defend such an ambitious program against the power bloc that would inevitably seek to thwart it. 

  8. A State-led Financial Empire

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    The United States’ increasing weaponization of global financial interdependency—through sanctions, blacklistings, reserve freezes, and the exclusion of entire states from global payment networks—has revived interest in alternatives to the dollar-dominated financial system across emerging economies. Perhaps the most important response to these policies has come from the People’s Republic of China.

    Having long prioritized domestic stability over the pursuit of a global role for the Renminbi (RMB), Beijing has recently accelerated its construction of a parallel financial architecture. Without seeking to fully replace the dollar’s global dominance, it has nevertheless sought to reduce its exposure to US monetary power while embedding its trading partners in RMB-denominated circuits of trade and finance.

    Whereas British and US financial dominance relied on open capital markets, private banking networks, and the global expansion of highly financialized instruments—from deep derivatives markets to speculative financial activity increasingly detached from the real economy—China’s strategy is state-led and more functional in orientation. RMB internationalization is more closely organized around trade settlement, investment channels, and funding for production and infrastructure. It deliberately avoids the full liberalization and speculative excesses that have inflated the size of the USD-based system far beyond underlying economic activity. Rather than building vast global capital markets, Beijing constructs controlled channels that facilitate cross-border RMB use while maintaining state oversight. This produces a qualitatively different financial empire: smaller in scale compared to the sprawling dollar system, but informed by trade relations, value chains, and political alliances, and structured around managed connectivity.

    These infrastructures are not neutral technical fixes. Their design determines who can access liquidity, how transactions are routed, and under which rules financial activity takes place. By embedding itself as a central node in these networks, China is doing more than internationalizing its currency: it is quietly reshaping the architecture of global finance by enhancing Beijing’s financial autonomy, reducing its exposure to US sanctions and monetary policy spillovers, while binding economic partners in the Global South more tightly to Beijing. The result is an expansive system of influence aiming to position China not as a sole hegemon but as a critical pillar in the new global order that is characterized by a growing fragmentation of financial and economic activity along geopolitical lines.

    From integration to fragmentation

    Efforts to internationalize the RMB have emerged gradually since the early 2000s. Over the past two decades, they have reflected a persisting tension between China’s growing economic weight and its cautious approach to financial exposure. In the wake of the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Chinese policymakers concluded that premature liberalization of capital flows exposed economies to destabilizing volatility. While the renminbi was made convertible for current account transactions in 1996, the capital account remained largely closed. This slow pace stood in stark contrast to China’s rapidly expanding trade footprint, creating a mismatch between its economic scale and the RMB’s international role.

    The 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis marked a turning point. The freezing of dollar liquidity worldwide underscored the risks of a global system dependent on a single reserve currency. In 2009, People’s Bank of China (PBoC) governor Zhou Xiaochuan openly questioned the sustainability of dollar dominance and proposed expanding the role of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or establishing a ‘super-sovereign’ reserve currency. The proposal, largely ignored by Washington, revealed a deep frustration in Beijing over the vulnerabilities inherent in a dollar-centric order. While never a top government priority, Chinese technocrats launched a series of pilot programs that laid the groundwork for its wider international use beyond its borders.

    The years leading up to 2016 were the high point of integration. With reforms to its exchange rate regime, a gradual widening of QFII quotas, and the creation of offshore RMB hubs in Hong Kong, London, and Singapore, the RMB’s global profile rose significantly. This culminated in its inclusion in the IMF’s SDR basket in October 2016, a milestone that appeared to validate China’s efforts to secure recognition for its currency within the existing global monetary order.

    Yet, behind the scenes, tensions were already mounting. US authorities maintained tight control over dollar clearing networks—centralized in US-regulated infrastructures like CHIPS and Fedwire—and have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to deny access to foreign banks or entire states, turning dollar settlement into a geopolitical lever. At the same time, Federal Reserve swap lines remained largely restricted to advanced economies, excluding China and other emerging markets, reinforcing asymmetric access to the core of the dollar system. Meanwhile, speculative inflows into China’s stock market and a turbulent 2015–2016 devaluation episode triggered massive capital flight, leading Beijing to reassert strict capital controls. This underscored the incompatibility between full RMB internationalization on US-style terms and China’s priority of maintaining domestic monetary stability.

    The post-2016 period has been defined by growing geopolitical confrontation and partial decoupling. The weaponization of the dollar—through sanctions on Chinese partners like Iran, the freezing of Russian reserves, and the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT—highlighted how financial infrastructures could be used as tools of coercion. For Beijing, these events reinforced the need to develop RMB-based alternatives that could shield China and its partners from such vulnerabilities. Attempts at cooperation on global reforms, such as expanded SDR issuance or multilateral payment initiatives under the G20, have repeatedly stalled in the face of US reluctance to dilute its monetary power.

    The result has been a strategic pivot: rather than seeking to integrate into the existing dollar system, China has focused on building a parallel set of infrastructures—anchored around its own trade networks and political partners, particularly in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and other parts of the Global South—that could sustain cross-border RMB use on their own terms. This new strategy unfolded across three functional domains: payments, investment and funding. Together, they form the backbone of an emerging Sino-centric financial system. Each represents a deliberate effort to bypass US-controlled channels, insulate China from external monetary coercion, and weave Chinese partners more tightly into RMB-based networks.

    Payments

    Since the Global Financial Crisis, China has undertaken a deliberate and incremental strategy to build payment infrastructures that support RMB-denominated transactions, bypassing US-controlled clearing networks where necessary and reducing exposure to Western financial coercion. These infrastructures are designed to create the conditions for a broader RMB-based financial ecosystem, offering partners alternative channels for trade settlement while maintaining China’s ability to tightly manage cross-border capital flows.

    The motivation behind this strategy is clear: although China has become the world’s largest trading nation (by 2023, it was the largest trading partner for 120 countries) the RMB’s share of global trade settlement remains limited. RMB trade has remained overwhelmingly denominated in USD, and Chinese trade itself has long been overwhelmingly invoiced in dollars.

    To address this, Chinese policymakers have actively pursued the creation of state-backed financial infrastructures that facilitate RMB payments, ensuring that companies and financial institutions across the world can easily conduct transactions in the Chinese currency, while maintaining a relatively controlled capital account. Several key infrastructures have been developed to facilitate cross-border RMB payments, each contributing to the gradual expansion of the currency’s role in international trade, and at each step of the way, these infrastructures have become more accessible to countries seeking an alternative to the Dollar trade.

    The first major step in this process was the introduction of the Cross-Border RMB Trade Settlement Pilot Scheme in 2009. This initiative initially allowed a select group of Chinese companies to settle trade transactions in RMB with designated partners in Hong Kong, Macau, and ASEAN nations. This framework created a legal and institutional foundation for RMB payments outside of China for the first time. Over time, as Chinese authorities gained confidence in the system and ensured that it did not destabilize domestic monetary policy, the program was expanded nationwide in 2012, allowing all Chinese firms to settle any type of cross-border transaction in RMB with partners worldwide.

    Beyond its technical impact, the scheme began to normalize RMB use in global trade relations, laying the groundwork for a gradual shift away from dollar-denominated invoicing and giving Beijing a first tool to strengthen monetary ties with its trading partners. The impact of this reform has been substantial. While cross-border payments in RMB were virtually non-existent in 2010, by March 2025 the RMB accounted for 54.3 percent of China’s total trade settlement.

    A second major step was the establishment of offshore RMB clearing banks. Clearing banks serve as designated financial institutions that facilitate RMB transactions in foreign jurisdictions, allowing overseas banks to settle RMB transactions efficiently without needing direct access to China’s domestic financial system. This model significantly improved transaction efficiency by eliminating reliance on traditional correspondent banking networks, which had previously slowed transaction times and increased costs. First established in Hong Kong in 2003, China rapidly expanded its clearing bank network. By November 2024, offshore RMB clearing banks had been established in 33 economies, including London, Singapore, Frankfurt, and New York.

    These hubs not only reduced transaction costs but also anchored RMB liquidity pools abroad, effectively extending China’s monetary reach without dismantling its capital controls. Each clearing bank agreement represents a negotiated institutional link to Beijing’s financial system, incrementally building the infrastructure for a Sino-centric payments network. The growth of offshore clearing banks has played a crucial role in fostering a liquid offshore RMB market. These banks provide local financial institutions with access to RMB settlement, reducing the need for foreign exchange conversion and helping businesses conduct trade with China in its own currency. Clearing banks have become a key driver in increasing RMB-denominated trade globally.

    Beyond offshore clearing banks, however, China also sought a more comprehensive infrastructure to further streamline RMB payments. In 2015, it launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS)—a centralized platform that enables direct clearing and settlement of RMB transactions worldwide. While it launched with just 19 direct participants and 176 indirect participants, by 2024, it had expanded to 168 direct participants and 1,461 indirect participants from 117 countries. This infrastructure has facilitated over 8.9 million transactions totaling USD 23.1 trillion, with 62 percent of transactions originating outside China. CIPS is more than a technical upgrade to global payments—it represents an institutional alternative to Western-dominated infrastructures like SWIFT and CHIPS. This gives China a growing ability to conduct and settle trade flows beyond the reach of US monetary and sanctions power. While CIPS remains significantly smaller than its USD-based counterparts, its rapid growth illustrates its potential as an alternative global payment system. Importantly, major Western financial institutions, including Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, and Standard Chartered, have all joined CIPS, signaling its growing relevance in global finance.

    Yet, the latest—and potentially most disruptive—development in RMB payment infrastructure is Project mBridge, a multi-central bank digital currency (CBDC) platform initiated by China, Thailand, Hong Kong, the UAE, and the BIS. Unlike traditional payment systems, mBridge is built on blockchain-based technology and enables real-time, direct cross-border settlement between CBDCs, bypassing conventional banking networks. A primary objective of mBridge is to eliminate reliance on the USD in international trade transactions. Unlike existing systems where cross-border payments require intermediary banks and multiple currency conversions (often through USD), mBridge allows direct RMB settlements between central banks and commercial banks. By creating payment channels that operate outside Western-controlled clearinghouses, Beijing is testing the foundations of a parallel digital monetary network that could, over time, give participating economies a viable escape route from dollar dominance.

    The geopolitical implications of mBridge are significant. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia in 2024 suggests that China may be laying the groundwork for non-USD oil transactions, a longstanding strategic objective. This project also provides a potential model for sanction-resistant payment infrastructure, allowing participating countries to settle transactions outside the influence of Western financial institutions. While the RMB remains underutilized in Europe and North America, its adoption and use has accelerated in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Recent trends in commodity trade settlement, such as RMB-settled LNG transactions with the UAE, underscore how financial infrastructure is advancing de-dollarization efforts, particularly among countries wary of U.S. financial sanctions. However, RMB transactions to date remain largely bilateral with China, with minimal third-country use outside specific cases (that often involved sanctioned countries like Russia).

    The expansion of RMB payment infrastructure is central to China’s long-term financial strategy. By creating a global network of clearing banks, interbank payment systems, and digital currency platforms, China has built the foundations for an RMB-based international financial system. These infrastructures are instruments of financial statecraft. They not only facilitate the RMB’s practical use but also strengthen China’s financial autonomy by reducing reliance on USD-based networks. While the RMB is still far from replacing the USD as the dominant global currency, the architecture for an alternative system now exists, giving Beijing both optionality in future crises and growing leverage over the terms of global payments.

    Financial infrastructures

    Many commentators argue that China’s restricted capital account continues to hinder its internationalization. Yet this view underestimates Beijing’s deliberate strategy to internationalize on its own terms. Rather than replicating US-style open and speculative capital markets, China has built a state-managed infrastructure that selectively connects foreign investors to its domestic markets. These tightly controlled channels allow cross-border investment to grow without surrendering monetary sovereignty—advancing RMB internationalization while preserving the political and regulatory autonomy that underpins China’s distinct form of financial empire.

    Initially, China’s capital markets were largely isolated from global finance. Foreign investors had minimal access to RMB-denominated assets, with early mechanisms like the B-share market and offshore listings operating in a separate system without directly integrating RMB assets into global investment flows. However, beginning in the mid-2000s, China shifted toward a managed opening, introducing a series of controlled mechanisms that enabled foreign investors to participate in its domestic markets. These reforms were not designed to mimic Western capital mobility but to test, calibrate, and scale access in ways that served domestic priorities while gradually positioning the RMB as an investable currency globally.

    The first major initiative was the establishment of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program in 2002, which allowed licensed foreign institutions to invest in China’s stock and bond markets under strict quota limits. This was followed by the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) program in 2011, which allowed offshore RMB to be reinvested into onshore capital markets, leveraging the growing pool of RMB held outside China. While these quota-based systems marked an initial step toward financial integration, they remained highly restrictive, requiring approvals, imposing repatriation limits, and constraining trading activities. Rather than liberalizing rapidly, Beijing designed these schemes to bring in long-term, stable investors on its own terms.

    While QFII was originally underutilized, a turning point came in 2014 with the introduction of Stock Connect, a cross-border trading mechanism linking the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets. Unlike the quota-based QFII and RQFII schemes, Stock Connect provided a more seamless and scalable channel for foreign investors to access China’s A-shares, significantly reducing barriers to entry. International investors could now buy eligible Chinese stocks through a special purpose vehicle in Hong Kong, while Chinese investors could access Hong Kong-listed equities through the same mechanism. The design of Stock Connect allowed for more efficient transactions, eliminated the need for upfront quota approvals, and ensured a steady flow of foreign capital into China’s markets. By 2023, foreign investors accounted for approximately 7 percent of trading in China’s stock markets, a sharp increase from just 0.6 percent in 2014. This again advanced RMB internationalization, not by liberalizing markets wholesale, but by creating controlled conduits that preserved Beijing’s oversight of cross-border flows and thereby reinforcing its vision of a state-led financial empire.

    Following the success of Stock Connect, similar infrastructures were developed for bond markets. In 2016, the China Interbank Bond Market (CIBM) Direct program was introduced, allowing foreign institutions, including central banks and commercial banks, to invest in Chinese bonds without requiring prior regulatory approval. This was supplemented by the launch of Bond Connect in 2017, which provided an even more seamless route for international investors to access China’s bond markets through established global trading platforms such as Bloomberg and Tradeweb. The introduction of these infrastructures led to a significant increase in foreign ownership of Chinese government bonds, which rose from 0.3 percent in 2012 to eleven percent by 2021. These mechanisms expanded access to RMB-denominated debt while keeping capital flows firmly within a framework designed by Chinese regulators.

    A key feature of these infrastructural arrangements is their design as “closed-loop” systems, deliberately constructed to allow participation in China’s markets without ceding control over the broader capital account. While they enable foreign investment in RMB assets, they maintain capital controls by restricting the free movement of funds beyond designated investment channels. This approach allows China to attract foreign capital while minimizing risks associated with speculative flows and financial instability. Moreover, China extended its Connect model to other asset classes, such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs), wealth management products, and interest rate swaps. This has been further complemented by the development of RMB-denominated financial instruments, including stock indices, futures, and cross-currency hedging tools, especially in Hong Kong, which provide international investors with greater flexibility in managing their exposure to Chinese assets.

    While geopolitical tensions have led to fluctuations in foreign investment flows—particularly among U.S. investors—the broader trajectory of RMB asset internationalization has continued. In recent years, a decisive shift has occurred in the geography of RMB investments, with non-Western financial institutions, especially those from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, expanding their allocations to Chinese markets.

    Sovereign wealth funds from Singapore, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait have emerged as major investors in Chinese stock and bond markets, with Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds alone channeling over USD six billion into Chinese equities in 2024, up from just 100 million two years earlier. This was also accompanied by cross-listing of ETFs and other financial products, the mutual opening of branches and accelerating financial diplomacy. This changing investor base reflects more than portfolio diversification: it mirrors Beijing’s deliberate strategy of fostering capital linkages with economies already tied into its trade and infrastructure networks, building an RMB investor ecosystem outside Western-dominated financial circuits. Meanwhile, US investors have faced growing regulatory pressure to reduce their exposure to China, with Washington imposing sanctions on Chinese companies and pressuring index providers to exclude Chinese assets. These diverging investment flows underscore how RMB asset internationalization is increasingly anchored in a multipolar, geopolitically fragmented financial order.

    Through the development of these financial infrastructures, Beijing has laid the foundations for a distinct, state-managed model of currency internationalization. While de jure its capital account remains restricted, the combination of Connect programs, bond market access schemes, and offshore RMB markets has enabled a level of de facto global integration without relinquishing domestic control. As these systems continue to grow—particularly among non-Western financial actors—they provide the necessary conditions for a wider role of the RMB in global investment flows, gradually reinforcing China’s financial influence in an increasingly multipolar world.

    Funding

    The construction of financial infrastructures for RMB-denominated financing also plays a crucial role in advancing the currency’s internationalization. Rather than building vast, speculative offshore credit markets as in the U.S.-dollar system, China has pursued a functional, state-managed approach focused on trade, infrastructure, and productive investment. Through the development of panda bonds, dim sum bonds, and bilateral swap lines, China has created mechanisms that facilitate the accumulation, circulation, and liquidity of RMB liabilities beyond its domestic financial system. These infrastructures allow foreign borrowers to access RMB funding, expand the pool of RMB-denominated assets, and provide financial stability measures that encourage the broader use of the currency. While the RMB’s role as a global funding currency remains small, these infrastructural developments have laid important groundwork for its future expansion.

    The introduction of panda bonds has enabled foreign corporations, financial institutions, and governments to raise RMB capital within China’s domestic market. Initially constrained by regulatory uncertainty and capital controls, a series of gradual reforms—including clearer issuance rules and the removal of restrictions on repatriating funds—have expanded the market’s appeal. Early issuances were small and experimental, but have grown in scale and scope: in 2016, Poland was the first European state to issue a sovereign panda bond, and in 2023 Hungary used the bonds to fund Belt and Road infrastructure projects, with the proceeds partially used to pay Chinese contractors in RMB. Foreign firms such as Mercedes-Benz, HSBC, and Trafigura began to issue panda bonds in early 2025, taking advantage of low Chinese rates and hedging against Western financial risks. Each issuance strengthens the ecosystem of RMB-denominated assets, creating more opportunities for foreign entities to fund themselves within China’s financial architecture.

    The dim sum bond market, launched in Hong Kong in 2007, provides a complementary offshore channel, with bonds issued in financial hubs like Hong Kong, London, and Luxembourg. Initially dominated by Chinese state-owned banks, it gradually attracted multinational issuers like McDonald’s (2010) and HSBC (2012), testing global demand for RMB-denominated debt outside mainland China. Dim sum bond issuance nearly tripled from around USD 18 billion in 2022 to USD 34 billion in 2023, driven not only by Chinese issuers but also a growing share of foreign corporations and sovereign entities tapping Hong Kong’s offshore RMB market. In particular, non-financial corporations outside China expanded their dim sum issuance fivefold over the 2020–2024 period, reflecting a deliberate turn toward RMB funding to support trade, investment, or regional diversification strategies. Both panda and dim sum markets remain small compared to dollar or euro bond markets, but they embed cross-border credit relations in RMB, allowing borrowers to diversify away from dollar funding while increasing their reliance on Chinese financial institutions and investor pools.

    Beyond bond markets, China’s network of bilateral swap lines has become a cornerstone of its RMB funding strategy. Unlike the swap arrangements offered by the U.S. Federal Reserve, which are largely limited to advanced economies and designed for crisis liquidity, China’s swaps serve a dual function, providing RMB liquidity during periods of market stress and backstopping cross-border RMB transactions. This dual function enables regular RMB-denominated trade and investment settlements between participating economies.

    Notably, China’s RMB liquidity networks are in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. This geographic shift reflects a broader pattern in China’s financial diplomacy—strengthening RMB adoption in regions where demand for alternatives to the dollar is highest and where China is a dominant trading partner. By guaranteeing RMB access in periods of volatility or despite sanctions pressure, these swap lines entrench China’s role as a financial backstop for non-Western economies, weaving them more tightly into RMB-centric networks.

    Based on growing offshore capital pools and central bank backstops, Chinese banks have in recent years rapidly increased the issuance of RMB-denominated loans while simultaneously scaling back dollar lending. Between 2015 and 2024, Chinese financial institutions’ RMB lending increased from seven percent to forty percent of overseas loans, with an especially sharp increase after 2022. This had a significant global impact, with total dollar lending to emerging market economies declining by ten percent between 2022 and 2024.

    Beyond credit channels, Beijing has begun to link RMB to gold as a trusted reserve asset. In June 2025, the Shanghai Gold Exchange opened its first international gold vault in Hong Kong, alongside new RMB-denominated gold contracts, settled either in cash or physical delivery offshore. This setup allows global investors to convert offshore RMB directly into physical gold, effectively providing a gold-backed mechanism for RMB holdings outside mainland China. By linking the Yuan to a trusted reserve asset, Beijing strengthens international confidence in its currency, adding a quasi-safe-haven function to offshore RMB markets. This initiative complements panda and dim sum bonds, encouraging investors to hold RMB while retaining the option of redemption into gold. As part of a broader state-led effort to build RMB-denominated funding markets, the Hong Kong gold vault extends China’s financial infrastructure beyond credit and swap lines into reserve asset security, deepening the structural appeal of RMB funding. This directly supports de‑dollarization efforts by enabling gold imports and settlements in RMB rather than dollars, representing a powerful extension of China’s financial expansion.

    These infrastructures contribute to a reinforcing cycle—expanding the presence of RMB-denominated assets while ensuring the liquidity required to sustain and grow their adoption in global markets. Rather than replicating the deep, speculative funding markets underpinning the US dollar’s dominance, Beijing is building a more functional and strategically targeted ecosystem, closely tied to trade, infrastructure, and productive investment. As China deepens its financial ties with the Global South, these funding mechanisms position the RMB as an increasingly relevant currency in non-Western financial circuits, gradually consolidating Beijing’s centrality in global financial flows.

    A Sino-centric financial empire?

    Over two decades, the RMB project has evolved from a tentative attempt at integration into the US-dominated order to a deliberate effort to rewire monetary and financial connectivity on Beijing’s terms. The result is not a bid for outright replacement of dollar hegemony, but the gradual construction of a parallel financial architecture—one that reduces China’s exposure to U.S. monetary coercion while binding its trading partners into RMB-denominated trade, investment, and funding networks.

    As China’s financial architecture matures, what emerges is not merely a strategy for currency internationalization, but the scaffolding of a broader geopolitical project. Corresponding with other areas like supply chains, digital infrastructures, resources or green technology, this is a project of empire building, creating a network of asymmetric economic connectivity centred around a dominant core.

    In the case of RMB internationalization, offshore clearing hubs, investment channels, swap networks, and digital payment platforms rewire cross-border finance in ways that enhance Beijing’s autonomy and create new dependencies for its partners, especially across the Global South. Participation in China’s growing economic sphere increasingly implies participation in its financial sphere, where access to liquidity, settlement systems, and investment flows are intermediated by Chinese institutions and rules.

    The deliberate buildout of RMB infrastructure—from clearing banks to mBridge and commodity pricing mechanisms—has established alternative channels that bypass Western-controlled systems. As China consolidates its role as a dominant trading partner for emerging markets, these infrastructures provide the foundation for growing RMB internationalization. While displacement of the U.S. dollar remains unlikely, and is not Beijing’s immediate objective, China’s parallel financial system offers it and its partners a managed pathway to greater financial autonomy while tightening their structural ties to Beijing.

    This emerging financial system differs fundamentally from its liberal precedents. Whereas US financial dominance was built on open capital markets, institutional dominance, and a vast ecosystem of highly financialized instruments detached from real production, China’s strategy is state-led, functional, and deliberately restrained. RMB internationalization is primarily tied to trade, infrastructure financing, and productive investment, avoiding the speculative excesses that have inflated the scale of the dollar system far beyond underlying economic activity. The result is a smaller, more targeted financial network that embeds China at its center.

    The Global South is central to this project. Through swap lines, RMB bond markets, and partial acquisitions of stock exchanges in places like Pakistan, Kazakhstan or Bangladesh, Beijing is exporting regulatory frameworks, trading rules, and market infrastructures that reorient capital flows toward China-led systems. Cross-border capital platforms, RMB bond issuance, and settlement mechanisms gradually tether emerging economies to China’s institutions, shifting financial influence away from Western networks.

    Historically, financial empires shaped global capital flows by controlling trade, credit, and reserve structures. While China’s approach mirrors this logic, it is constructing an alternative financial architecture that strengthens its centrality internationally while preserving regulatory control domestically, representing a more managed, state-led approach to financial internationalization.

    China is not building a dollar-style empire of sprawling markets and speculative finance. It is constructing something leaner, more functional, and tightly managed—a financial order that underwrites trade, infrastructure, and productive investment while insulating Beijing from US leverage. The future trajectory of this system remains uncertain. Its growth will depend on how many countries choose to integrate into these parallel channels. Yet the underlying infrastructures are now firmly established. Whether complementary to or competing with the dollar system, this embeds China as a central node in an increasingly fragmenting global monetary order—quietly redrawing the map of financial power.

  9. Policy-Constrained Growth

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    Despite headwinds from higher interest rates in the US and at home, the Brazilian economy is nevertheless emerging from a period of prolonged stagnation. After growing an average of 0.2 percent a year between 2015 and 2022, national growth averaged 3.3 percent annually during 2023–2024, the first two years of President Lula’s third term. Though quite modest in comparison to the massive social needs of a developing country, this is still better than expected.1In order for developing countries to catch-up to the level of GDP per capita of the advanced economies, not only its GDP but also its GDP per capita must grow sufficiently faster than they do for very long periods of time. Therefore the many government statements that it plans to grow at the same rate of world economy is clearly unsatisfactory. Part of Brazil’s recent positive performance has been due to growing exports, to be sure. But the bulk of Brazil’s current economic growth stems from a cause the government itself has been reluctant to recognize: expansionary fiscal policy, which has generated sufficient demand to counteract these forces of contraction.

    There are reasons to celebrate this growth performance. First, it marks a great improvement on Brazil’s recent bleak past. Between 2015 and 2022, fiscal austerity and neoliberal reforms reduced the level of domestic demand and produced stagnant GDP growth: by the end of 2022, the internal market was smaller than it had been in 2014. Since 2023, it has begun to increase again, leading to higher business investment, which grew faster than GDP in 2024. Finally, because of rapid changes in demographic dynamics, the growth rate of GDP per capita in Lula’s third term (2.9 percent a year) is nearly the same as the one obtained from 2003 to 2010, in  the previous—and relatively prosperous—Lula era (3.0 percent a year).2The growth rate of population has lately been decreased sharply, from an average of 1.0 percent during the first two presidential mandates of Lula (2003–2010) to 0.4 percent now.

    The table below summarizes the main components of aggregate demand in Brazil since 2003. 

    We shall argue that apart from exports (where growth accelerated alongside the process of ‘re-primarization’), the bulk of Brazil’s recent positive performance has been due to its expansionary fiscal policy. The growth of government spending and business investment, however, was not entirely by design.  The explicitly stated economic policy priorities for Lula’s third  term are monetary policy guided by an  inflation target, and the priority of stabilizing the ratio of public debt to GDP. But a peculiar conjunction of events has fortuitously pushed fiscal policy toward expansion. Detailed below, the Brazilian economy’s transition from Bolsonaro’s program briefly allowed the government to raise the level of aggregate demand, despite both Treasury guidance toward slowing the growth of public debt and interest rates dramatically higher than at any time over the last decade.3Note that such ratio in reality creates no actual problem as it is paid in local currency at interest rates largely under control of the Brazilian central bank.

    Nevertheless, Finance Minister Fernando Haddad has been arguing that Brazilian growth can continue without further fiscal expansion, led by household consumption and private investment—as if these factors were not highly influenced by fiscal policy. The central bank, too, blames expansionary fiscal policy for a presumed overheating of the Brazilian economy in hiking the country’s basic interest rate. Despite massive underemployment and informality, the low unemployment rate and growth of real wages are understood as inflationary problems to be solved by constraining demand.

    It appears that the official federal program is guided by the theory that potential output grows independently of aggregate demand. Official justifications for fiscal-monetary tightening assume that growth will continue—at a rate as low as 2.5 percent—if demand is constrained by policy. It is government spending and a stronger currency, however, that have propelled Brazilian growth. Overall, the impact of fiscal expansion on demand was stronger than the contractionary effects of a tighter monetary policy, whose negative (but limited) effects were mainly felt in residential investment. The fallout of higher interest rates was probably more than offset by changes in the exchange rate, which contributed to higher real wages and increased consumption—the latter also driven by the policy of minimum wage increases and lower unemployment rates. 

    Beyond demand: external conditions and monetary policy

    Since 2022, rising interest rates set by the US Federal Reserve have made it more difficult for many emerging economies to sustain expansionary policies amid balance of payments constraints.4Serrano, F., Summa, R., & Aidar, G. (2021). Exogenous interest rate and exchange rate dynamics under elastic expectations. (<)em(>)Investigación económica(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)80(<)/em(>)(318), 3-31. Brazil, however, has continued to face quite favorable external financial conditions during this recent period. Since the mid‐2000s, despite persistent current account deficits, Brazil has accumulated massive foreign exchange reserves and substantial capital inflows. The ratio of the country’s short-term external debt to its foreign reserves remains below 30 percent. Over the past decade, total external debt has averaged around 71 percent of reserve assets, meaning that the country’s overall external position has remained relatively comfortable.

    A key aspect of improvement in the Brazilian external accounts has been the process of “de-dollarization” of its external liabilities. This means that now a large share of Brazilian external liabilities (such as public bonds and shares held by non-residents) are denominated in Brazil´s own currency, making creditors bear the exchange rate risk and making the economy less vulnerable to large exchange-rate movements. These facts allowed Brazil to finance sizeable current account deficits in 2023-24 without creating vulnerabilities. 
    The structure of Brazil’s large current account deficits reflects net profit, dividend and interest outflows in excess of the country’s trade surplus. In balance of payments accounting,  an excess of payments out over receipts is financed by capital and financial inflows, which usually require higher interest rate differentials to attract.5For a detailed explanation, see: Summa, Ricardo; Haluska, Guilherme and Serrano, Franklin. Actual government spending and the resumption of growth in Brazil: 2023-24. Working paper (2025).While the nominal exchange rate appreciated around 10 percent in 2023, linked to an improvement in the current account and a higher interest rate differential, both reversed in 2024 amid growing imports due to stronger economic growth, a recovery in business investment, and a smaller interest rate differential. The nominal exchange rate thus depreciated 10 percent between January and September 2024. By the end of 2024, the nominal exchange rate had sharply depreciated by an additional 13 percent.6Three main factors account for that: 1) the fact that firms usually remit profits and dividends abroad in December; 2) a “flight to the dollar” driven by uncertainties around the US elections; the initial lack of intervention in the foreign exchange rate market by the Brazilian central bank—which, later, acted to reverse this trend. Again, see Summa, Haluska and Serrano (2025). This has led the central bank to sell dollars and raise the base interest rate significantly, which again increased the differential and helped the currency appreciate. 

    Central bank management of Brazil’s exchange rate  is relevant for understanding the country’s inflation dynamics because Brazil is a price taker in many international markets. Its nominal costs of production largely depend on the price of tradable goods in dollars converted into local prices by the exchange rate. Both the evolution of international prices and nominal exchange rate dynamics are, therefore, major sources of cost-push inflation for the country.7Other cost-side factors are government-regulated prices and labor costs that increase as a result from nominal wage bargaining. This accounts for monetary policy being so tight in 2023–24.

    In fact, monetary policy in the recent period has been significantly tighter than in 2015–2022, when the economy was stagnating. In 2021–2022, simultaneous increases in commodity prices in US dollars and sharp exchange rate depreciation pushed inflation up to 12 percent. The central bank reacted by increasing the base interest rate, which reached 13.75 percent by the end of 2022. Figure 1 presents the rate of inflation, the inflation target (and its upper and lower limits), and the nominal policy interest rate in Brazil from January 2015 to January 2025. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the ex-post real interest rate, adjusting the nominal rate for inflation, from 2003 to 2024. It shows the real interest rate today to be much higher than the average for the previous periods of 2011–2014 and 2015–2022.8We follow the periodicity as proposed in Serrano and Summa (2015) and Haluska et al (2025). The period 2003–2010 mark Lula’s presidential terms, where growth rates were higher due mainly to expansionary fiscal policy, despite a higher average real interest rate. The period 2011–2014 mark the deceleration of growth in Dilma’s first mandate, as an attempt to control fiscal expansion and compensate it by higher private spending, which supposedly would come from a lower interest rate and a depreciated real exchange rate. The third period marks fiscal austerity policies that started in the second term of Dilma Roussef (cut short by the 2016 impeachment) and continued in the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations, leading to high unemployment and falling real wages and inflation. The ensuing lower real interest rates were associated with GDP stagnation. Finally, the period 2023–24 is the one under analysis in this article.

    During 2023, global commodity prices fell and the domestic currency appreciated, weakening external inflationary pressures. The central bank then started to reduce the base interest rate, to 10.5 percent in mid-2024. However, the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in 2024 brought prices higher, particularly of food and tradable goods—which under the central bank’s inflation target meant an increase in interest rates to their current highs.9For more details on the causes of the exchange rate devaluation in Brazil in 2024, see: Marins, N., Summa, R. & Consul, D. (2025) The behavior of the nominal exchange rate between the Brazilian Real and the dollar in 2024. (<)a href='https://nakedkeynesianism.blogspot.com/2025/03/the-behavior-of-nominal-exchange-rate.html'(>)Naked Keynesianism blogpost(<)/a(>).

    The Brazilian inflation that peaked at 12 percent annually in early 2022 was driven by cost-push factors particularly among tradeables. Because workers were unable to adjust their nominal wages to rising prices—inflation outpaced wage growth—there was a decline in real wages. Likewise, the decline in inflation the following year reflected cost-side elements, rather than changes to aggregate demand: inflation continued downward despite falling unemployment, an increase in the minimum wage, and the return of GDP growth. In 2024, inflation rose slightly to 4.8 percent, almost the same as 2023, reflecting a depreciating currency and a modest increase in international prices.

    A crucial factor in the Central Bank’s interest rate setting and the resulting level of the real interest rate is the government’s inflation target. In 2018, monetary policy targeted 4.5 percent annual growth in prices with an upper limit of 6 percent. It has since been progressively reduced.  By 2024, the target was 3 percent with an upper limit of 4.5 percent. Even though annual inflation in 2024 was almost similar to the number registered in 2023, the target was not met and so interest rates were increased. 

    In 2023–24, average real wages from formal jobs grew around 1.7 percent each year. Nevertheless, real wage levels remained 3 percent below their level in 2014, right before the economy started to stagnate. The gradual reduction in inflation targets was associated with flatlining and then decreasing real wages. At the same time, as a result of these changes, real interest rates have gone up. Why, in that case, has Brazilian growth accelerated under Lula’s third term?

    Aggregate demand and its components

    Exports are only a small part of the answer. Despite a more appreciated real exchange rate in 2023–4, exports grew at 5.9 percent annually, faster than the growth rates of either world GDP (3.3 percent) or global goods and services trade (1.9 percent). The growth of exports was particularly impressive in 2023, as Brazil benefited from both a very good harvest and, as an effect of the war in Ukraine, increased oil exports. 

    Imports grew on average 6.5 percent over the two years, mostly because of the rapid rise of imports in 2024, following the delayed but strong recovery of business investment.

    Brazil, however, is a continental country and has a small share of exports—about 18 percent—of GDP in 2023–24. The external sector is not capable of inducing high rates of growth of aggregate demand and GDP in the absence of increases in domestic components of demand.10Freitas, F. N., & Dweck, E. (2013). The pattern of economic growth of the Brazilian economy 1970–2005: a demand-led growth perspective. In (<)em(>)Sraffa and the Reconstruction of Economic Theory: Volume Two: Aggregate Demand, Policy Analysis and Growth(<)/em(>) (pp. 158-191). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK; Haluska, G. (2023). A economia brasileira no século XXI: uma análise a partir do modelo do Supermultiplicador Sraffiano. (<)em(>)Economia e Sociedade(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)32(<)/em(>)(2), 297-332; Campana, J. M., Vaz, J. E., Hein, E., & Jungmann, B. (2024). Demand and growth regimes of the BRICs countries–the national income and financial accounting decomposition approach and an autonomous demand-led growth perspective. (<)em(>)European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)21(<)/em(>)(1), 17-41. If we look at the actual contributions to growth of the external sector and the domestic demand, we can see that the external sector contributed, on average, to 1.1 percentage point (pp) to the growth of GDP per year in 2023–2024, while the domestic sector contributed to 2.2 pp. Fully two thirds of recent GDP growth can be attributed to the expansion of domestic demand.

    Fiscal Policy

    We now turn to how the economic policies adopted produced this expansion of the domestic market. In 2023, Brazil abandoned the cap on federal government spending imposed seven years earlier by the right-wing government of Michel Temer. That year, Congress authorized the government to spend more than Temer’s cap. For 2024, the government changed the fiscal rule to target a ceiling on government spending growth of between 0.6 percent and 2.5 percent, and a ratio between the primary surplus (the difference between primary spending and receipts) and GDP.11The cap on federal spending approved in the Temer’s government was included in the Brazilian Constitution and imposed a zero growth of real federal government expenditures. Nevertheless, in practice, although federal spending growth was considerably reduced, it did not actually fall to zero, as we showed in Haluska et al (2025). The new fiscal rule established in 2023 is statutory.

    Moving from institutional arrangements and fiscal rules to practice, the federal government under Lula has resumed the policy of increasing real minimum wage, after remaining frozen during Temer’s and Bolsonaro’s governments.12During Temer administration, the rule for adjusting the minimum wage still allowed for real increases. By then, the minimum wage should be adjusted according to past inflation and the growth of GDP of two years before; and in cases when GDP have fallen, the minimum wage would be adjusted only by past inflation. However, since GDP fell both in 2015 and in 2016, during the two years of Temer administration (2017–2018), the minimum wage was adjusted only for inflation, without real gains. It was only under Bolsonaro’s administration when the rule for adjusting the minimum wage changed, stablishing only adjustments according to inflation, without real increases. This is important to fiscal policy because many pensions and transfers to households are indexed to the minimum wage. In 2023, the real minimum wage increased around 3 percent in real terms each year.  Due to demographic changes, the number of elderly people in the country eligible to receive pensions has also been growing.  Therefore, the combination of increases in the real minimum wage and in the number of retired people together resulted in a substantial increase in the amount of transfers to households. 

    By itself, this would not be sufficient to push fiscal policy beyond the 2.5 percent cap on growth of federal expenditures in the new fiscal rules. However, this cap was suspended (by the so-called ‘PEC da Transição’) during 2023, as a law was approved to guarantee extra federal government spending during the year of transition between the old and the new fiscal rule. 

    Additionally, the federal government paid an important amount of judicial debt to households just a few days before the end of 2023—the so-called precatórios—which increased the transfers to households in that year increasing household consumption mostly in 2024.13Precatórios are court-ordered government debts. Under Bolsonaro, a 2021 law (“precatórios cap”) limited how much could be paid each year, postponing the rest in order to free fiscal space for other programs. This effectively froze part of the payments and created a backlog. In 2022, the Supreme Court struck down the cap as unconstitutional. As a result, in 2023 the Lula government had to resume payments, including both the new debts and part of the postponed ones, which caused a significant increase in fiscal spending.Also in 2024, additional spending for emergencies was made due to adverse climate events (such as floods in the state of Rio Grande do Sul and wildfires in various regions of the country). It should be noticed that both precatórios and emergency-related fiscal spending were excluded from the official fiscal target. 

    Finally, the increase in public expenditures was driven not only by the federal government, but also by the states and municipal governments, whose expenditures were boosted by increasing receipts and due to the 2024 municipal elections.14IPEA (2025) Carta de Conjuntura : n. 66, jan./mar. 2025 ‘BOX 3: O comportamento recente dos gastos dos entes subnacionais’ carta de conjuntura do IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea). Additionally, there was an expansion of investments made by state-owned enterprises of 28.6 percent a year, which are not included in the fiscal targets. As a result, total government consumption grew on average 2.8 percent a year during 2023 and 2024; total public investment increased 9.0 percent a year, and transfers to households grew 5.4 percent a year. In sum, while the base real interest rate was higher in the period 2023–24 than in 2015–22, fiscal policy was much more expansionary. 

    Autonomous demand, induced consumption and business investment

    Apart from public spending, there are three other important components of aggregate demand: household autonomous expenditures, induced consumption and induced business investment. Induced consumption represents spending out of contractual income (wages and salaries) generated by firms’ decisions to undertake production. Business investment is seen as induced because firms will typically only invest to produce output to meet their expected levels of demand. Autonomous spending represents spending independent of business production decisions, mainly by creation of consumer purchasing power out of credit or government spending.15For a theoretical discussion on the concept of autonomous demand and its relation with macroeconomic policies, see: Serrano, F., Summa, R., & Freitas, F. (2023). Autonomous demand-led growth and the supermultiplier: the theory, the model and some clarification. (<)em(>)Instituto de Economia UFRJ Working Paper(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)3(<)/em(>). By household autonomous expenditures, we mean the sum of autonomous consumption and residential investment which are sensitive to interest rates and credit conditions, and consumption out of public transfers. 

    As we saw in Figure 2, the real interest rate was high regarding historical averages, but it was reduced marginally from the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024. Also, the number of formal jobs increased considerably (3.4 percent a year, on average, during 2023–2024), and the informality rate decreased from 49.8 percent to 48.5 percent.16According to data from “(<)em(>)PNAD Contínua.”(<)/em(>)Workers in the formal labor market have much better access to cheaper credit; cheaper borrowing and formalization have together increased autonomous household spending. The federal government also launched a program for credit renegotiation to reduce household indebtedness, called Desenrola Brasil. As a consequence of all these factors, the consumption of durable goods grew on average 12.7 percent in 2023–2024.

    Regarding residential investment, the federal government resumed housing finance subsidies for low- and medium-income families launched in 2009 under Lula but extinguished in 2019 by Bolsonaro, the so-called “Minha Casa Minha Vida” program. This measure has not overcome higher interest rates: residential investment decreased 1.8 percent on average in 2023–2024. 

    Induced consumption among households increased as well. Real wages increased as a consequence of higher growth rates of GDP, lower unemployment rate, the policy of real minimum wage increase and the appreciation of the real exchange rate (which, as discussed,was a collateral effect of higher interest rate differentials). Average real wages from formal jobs grew around 1.7 percent per year, as can be seen in Figure 3. The real income of employees, which includes not only formal but also informal workers, grew even more, 4.8 percent a year, probably because not only compensation increased but also the better growth performance contributed to increasing the income of self-employed workers. Households’ induced consumption thus grew because of both the increase in real wages and the increase in employment.

    Finally, we get into the discussion of the behavior of business (non-residential private) investment. After falling in 2023, in 2024 induced business investment increased much more than the GDP in 2024 (7.1 percent). 

    This illustrates how business investment is made by firms: to build capacity in expectation of future demand. In 2023, expectations of growth were very low, but were slowly revised with the actual growth recovery.17Other part of the fall in investment in 2023 can be due to a temporary boost in investment in 2021-2022, when several companies anticipated their purchases of new trucks, because they must be produced with stricter rules about the emissions of pollutants, with higher production costs and prices, after 2023 (IPEA, 2024, Haluska et al, 2025). Since it was becoming clearer that growth was more permanent, business investment increased more than GDP in 2024.18As expected by the flexible accelerator mechanism. For empirical evidente for Brazil, see: Braga, J. (2020). Investment rate, growth, and the accelerator effect in the supermultiplier model: the case of Brazil. (<)em(>)Review of Keynesian Economics(<)/em(>), (<)em(>)8(<)/em(>)(3), 454-466. Despite high real interest rates in the period, private business investment increased rapidly in 2024 because of the recovery of aggregate demand.

    Policy-constrained demand-led growth

    The hesitation of the federal government to defend the expansionary fiscal policy and higher growth rates of GDP manifested even more recently. Because of its use in indexing transfer payments, the increase in the minimum wage was capped in 2025 to the same 2.5 percent ceiling on public expenditure growth. Benefits paid by Bolsa-Familia, the social insurance program covering over 20 million households in Brazil, have also been frozen in nominal terms (a real decline) since 2022—with proposals to increase them denied failing to pass.19The last important nominal increase in the main benefit paid by Bolsa Familia was made by the right-wing government of Bolsonaro, although in 2023 an additional benefit was included in Bolsa-familia to pay an extra amount for each 0 to 6 years old children in the family.

    The idea that government spending must be controlled to make space for faster growth led by the private sector, while being extremely popular among Brazilian economists of all persuasions, is not only based on flawed theoretical arguments, but has led to the slowdown of the Brazilian economy since 2011 and actual stagnation since 2015.20On slow down, see Serrano, F., & Summa, R. (2015). Aggregate demand and the slowdown of Brazilian economic growth in 2011-2014. Nova Economia, 25, 803-833. On stagnation: Haluska, G., Summa, R., & Serrano, F. (2025). The bridge to stagnation: government expenditure cap, reforms and the fall in the business investment share in Brazil (2015-2022) (No. 247/2025). Working Paper. If the current efforts to slow down the increase in Brazilian government expenditures are successful, the nation’s economic growth will unquestionably be reduced.

  10. Economic Resilience

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    When Israel launched its attack on Iran on June 13 of this year, its stated aim—backed by its ever-touted “right to self-defense”—was to undo Tehran’s nuclear program. In fact, it targeted both military and non-military sites, including hospitals, TV stations, prisons, civilian apartment buildings, and basic energy infrastructure. Nine days later, Israel had succeeded in drawing Washington into the war; it promptly deployed a fleet of its B2 heavy bombers, dropping hundreds of thousands of pounds of munitions. A total of 1,060 people—40 percent of these civilians—were killed, and almost 5,800 people were injured. 

    The twelve-day bombardment caused significant damage, but for the most part the country’s economy survived intact. Not only did the domestic supply of goods and services remain largely stable (a testament to the country’s domestic production capabilities, grassroots solidarity, and the effectiveness of government interventions), the longer-term consequences seem to so far be minimal as well. Years of international isolation and sanctions have prompted Iran to structure its economy in such a way as to insulate itself. Though it remains exposed to further interruption, Iran’s economy has so proven itself resilient. What explains its buoyancy?

    Solidarity and decentralization 

    In the first instance, Iran’s resilience in the face of Israel’s assault owes much to the grassroots efforts of its people, who rallied together to keep the economy moving amid the bombardment. Factory managers and workers vowed to maintain operations. “The lives of our workers are a priority,” maintained one manager. “Production continues, but with human-centeredness and prudence.”  Truck drivers, who had recently ended their strikes, played a significant role in transporting goods and keeping stores stocked. 

    In many neighborhoods, shopkeepers imposed voluntary rationing on essential goods to curb hoarding and ensure fair distribution. Some merchants went so far as to sell certain staples at cost, hanging banners on their storefronts proclaiming “Goods sold at purchase price!” These community-driven initiatives, coupled with reduced consumption, helped stabilize markets.

    Beyond this, key to Iran’s economic resilience is the fact of its decentralization. It is  dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and informal producers. Over 500 industrial parks are scattered across the country, housing thousands of SMEs that collectively form the backbone of domestic production. This broad geographic distribution of industry—mirrored by equally dispersed small retail shops and micro-level distribution channels—allows goods and services to keep flowing even during crises. When one region or supplier is disrupted, many others can continue operating, preventing a total breakdown of supply. While such decentralization can sacrifice some efficiency, it provides resilience by eliminating single points of failure in the nation’s economic system.

    Report on the number of industrial enterprises with ten employees and more in the country in 2010, (Statistical Center of Iran)

    Self-reliance under sanctions

    Another pillar of Iran’s wartime resilience is the country’s self-reliant manufacturing base, which has been cultivated over decades of sanctions and import substitution. In the wake of the 1979 revolution, “self-sufficiency” became a guiding economic principle. The decades-long, US-led sanctions regime—which began as early as 1996 with the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act led—had reinforced the government’s commitment to this self-sufficiency and, with it, a diverse industrial base. Iranian factories today produce a diverse range of products, including food, pharmaceuticals, textiles, home appliances, and automobiles. These industries generally lack global competitiveness and cater almost entirely to the domestic market, but their ability to meet local demand across a broad range of goods has proven crucial for the country’s economic resilience.

    In time, this inward orientation deepened. As the Obama administration tightened sanctions on Tehran in 2010, Iran’s Supreme Leader announced a set of policies for what he termed the Resistance Economy (Eghtesad-e Moghavemati); each promoted local production and sought to reduce dependency on imports. Implementation was limited at first, but when the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran responded decisively. It banned the import of more than 1,300 goods to conserve hard‑currency reserves and to encourage domestic producers to increase localization and reduce reliance on foreign partners. Trump’s threats of secondary sanctions also drove many foreign companies out of the country, handing a much larger share of the market of 90 million consumers to local firms. Domestic producers—some of which had previously been minor players or mere assembly contractors—seized the opportunity to expand their output and localize imported parts.

    This so-called forced protectionism soon yielded tangible results in various industries. Take apparel: national newspaper Farhikhtegan reported that before 2018, some twenty-eight foreign clothing brands were active in Iran’s retail market—including one popular Turkish chain with fourteen stores in Tehran alone. After sanctions drove these brands out, local brands rushed in to fill the void. New domestic manufacturers emerged and existing ones rapidly expanded, opening dozens of outlets across the country. Some launched over fifty branches, a scale of expansion previously unseen in Iran’s retail sector. 

    Another example is home appliances. The Iranian market was formerly dominated by imported Korean electronics, but this sector, too, has seen domestic companies gain a much larger share—80 percent since 2018. Iranian manufacturers now produce over 20 million appliances annually, from white goods to small appliances, in an effort to meet local demand (although producers still rely on imported components for advanced electronics such as televisions). The rapid proliferation of many small domestic brands in this arena has raised concerns about the quality of products and a lack of scale. The same decentralized, hyper-competitive market structure that boosts resilience can hinder efficiency and technological advancement in the long run.

    Production volume of selected products 2011-2021, (Iran’s Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade)

    The automotive industry—a cornerstone of Iran’s manufacturing sector—initially suffered more than most from the 2018 sanctions shock. Annual car output plunged from 1.5 million vehicles in 2017 to under 800,000 in 2018 as foreign partners withdrew and critical imported components became scarce. (More than half of the cars produced in 2018 were left unfinished on assembly lines due to missing parts.) Over the next few years, however, Iran’s automakers slowly rebuilt capacity by developing domestic substitutes for key parts and reorganizing supply chains. By the early 2020s, local car production had rebounded to roughly one million units per year—still below the pre-sanctions peak, but a testament to the industry’s adaptive recovery under isolation.

    State intervention and macroeconomic stability

    For all its shortcomings, the Iranian government undertook key and effective emergency measures that helped maintain stability. With decades of experience managing sanctions and distributing goods (a legacy from the Iran–Iraq War era), the government leveraged its existing infrastructure to ensure the availability of essentials. Domestic production was ramped up, distribution channels reinforced, and government departments—including border and customs offices—remained operational. The Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) ensured that land borders remained open and that imports and exports continued as normal.

    This meant that despite the turmoil, basic price stability was maintained in the short run. Iran’s consumer price index for July (which captured the tail end of the fighting) was up 3.5 percent from the previous month—only marginally above the 3.3 percent month-on-month inflation recorded in June before the war. In other words, the war itself did not spur a dramatic price spike for everyday goods.

    Monthly inflation rate in Iran from April 2024 to July 2025 (Statistical Center of Iran)

    This relatively mild impact on prices must be understood in context. Iran has been grappling with entrenched inflation of around 40 percent per year, a byproduct of sanctions and its fiscal deficit. The central bank’s strict contractionary stance alone has not subdued these price pressures. Meaningful cuts to government spending have proven politically difficult under sanctions, limiting the effectiveness of anti-inflation policies. Thus, even as emergency measures kept wartime inflation in check, the underlying challenge of stabilizing the economy remains.

    Vulnerablities

    For all its resilience, however, Iran’s economy is not immune from risk. For one, it is not entirely self-sufficient; the country still relies on imports for certain high-tech goods and medicines. Israel targeted several civilian medical facilities across Iran, including Hakim Children’s Hospital in Tehran, Farabi Hospital in Kermanshah, the Qasr-e-Shirin Welfare Center, and the Tehran Red Crescent Society Center—a clear violation of international humanitarian law, which explicitly safeguards healthcare infrastructure, even during times of conflict. Combined with a rise in injuries and disruptions to drug imports, they have placed significant pressure on Iran’s healthcare system.

    Israel’s targeted strikes on industrial parks and manufacturing plants, as well as cyber attacks on banking infrastructure further threaten stability. Two major Iranian banks, Sepah and Pasargad, suffered cyber intrusions that temporarily disrupted online services and account access, leading to temporary disruptions in their online services, including people losing access to their accounts. Both have since restored operations, but these attacks are part of what appears to be a coordinated effort to undermine daily life and potentially ignite social unrest.

    Beyond this, the broader economy faces a more nagging aftershock: depressed consumer demand. Many families curtailed spending during the conflict, both out of caution and because of disruptions to daily life. Reports indicate that Iran is entering its eighteenth month of recession; if this subdued demand continues, it could erode business revenues and make it difficult for factories to keep operating at capacity. Prolonged uncertainty or sporadic clashes could push some firms into unsustainable losses. To avert a wave of bankruptcies and job cuts, economists have urged the government to roll out emergency financial relief—much like the support programs used during the Covid-19 pandemic—to help vulnerable households and enterprises weather the post-conflict slump.

    The crisis has also forced a shift in the government’s economic priorities. Iran’s recently appointed Minister of Economy, Seyed Ali Madanizadeh, has effectively put his long-term reform agenda on hold to focus on immediate stabilization. Tasked with taming inflation and keeping supply chains intact amid the turmoil, Madanizadeh has emphasized pragmatic interventions over structural overhauls. He noted that thanks to “special measures and inter-agency coordination,” the volume of essential imports in the week of June 14–20 reached 980,000 tons—a 53 percent jump from the prior week—ensuring that food and other basics remained available despite the conflict. Such efforts illustrate how maintaining economic resilience has become the paramount goal, temporarily superseding other development objectives.

    Outlook

    By late June, a ceasefire had brought the fighting to a halt, allowing the economy to begin charting a path toward recovery. Residents who had fled major cities trickled back, and Tehran—the country’s commercial hub—saw life gradually return to its bazaars, offices, and factories. The government announced several compensation packages for businesses (such as deferred loan and tax payments) and individuals. Although some businesses were able to access the aid, in many cases the funds languished within bureaucratic channels, dampening the overall effect. Officials are still strategizing as to how to secure vital goods should hostilities flare up again. Iran’s geography offers some advantages in this respect: the nation shares land borders with seven countries and has maritime access to several more, providing multiple potential trade partners and supply routes. Tapping these alternative channels, if necessary, could help Iran mitigate the impact of any future blockade or supply shock.

    Yet the future remains uncertain. The immense losses suffered in this short conflict underscore the urgent need for a durable peace and for structural reforms to address the vulnerabilities that the war has laid bare. In the face of the latest bombardment, Iran’s economy has proven itself resilient, but the economic development that would help it to flourish requires more than an end to military warfare. It needs an end to the economic warfare, in the form of sanctions, waged by the US, Europe, and beyond.